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C ve C++ İle Güvenli Yazılım Geliştirme: Farklı Bir Yaklaşım 
Ağa bağlı bilgisayarlar yaygınlaştıkça, günlük işlerin yürütülmesinden devlet 
sistemlerinin otomasyonuna kadar her seviyede rol almaya başlamışlar ve bu 
sistemlerin güvenliği de kritik bir hal almıştır. Bilgi işlem sistemlerinin güvene layık 
olabilmesi için bütün bileşenlerinin güvenli olması gerekir; yazılım da bu 
bileşenlerden birisi, belki de en önemlisidir. Yazılımların, yaşam süreçlerinin her 
aşamasında güvenli bir yapıyla sonuçlanacak şekilde tasarlanmaları ve 
geliştirilmeleri gerekmektedir.  
Bu tez, bir yazılımın yaşam sürecini baştan sona ele almış ve getirdiği yeni fikirleri 
bu sürecin aşamalarına yerleştirmiştir. Konu ile ilgili yeterli arka plan bilgisi 
verdikten sonra yeni düşünceler tanıtılmış, örnekler verilmiş ve olabilecek başka 
seçenekler tartışılmıştır. Çoğu konuyu anlatırken, tamamlayıcı özelliği olduğu 
düşünülen bilgiler de ya tazin içinde verilmiş, ya da referans edilmiştir. Bu sayede 
geliştirme veya bakım gibi değişik aşamalardaki projelere referans kaynağı olarak 
hizmet verebilmektedir. Bu tezde ele alınan yaşam süreci, yazılım mühendisliğinde 
sıklıkla başvuru olarak kullanılan, süreci isteklerin tanımı, tasarım, geliştirme, 
kontrol etme ve bakım olarak bölümleyen “Şelale Yaşam Süreci”dir.  
Yeni nesil programlama dilleri çıktıkça, C/C++ ve Birleştirici gibi düşük seviye 
dillerin yeni öğrencilerce benimsenmesi azalmaktadır. Buna ve başka sebeplere de 
bağlı olarak bu dillerde tecrübeli eleman eksikliği baş gösterdikçe, zaten güvenliğin 
sağlanmasının göreceli olarak daha zor olduğunun görüldüğü bu ortamlarda ciddi 
güvenlik açıkları oluşmaktadır. Dünya üzerindeki kod tabanının çoğunluğunun halen 
bu dillerden oluşması, durumu daha da kritik yapmaktadır. Bu makalede bahsedilen 
konuların çoğunluğu dilden bağımsız olsa da, ilgili bölümlerde, az önce bahsedilen 
sorunu göz önüne alarak C/C++ ve Birleştirici dilleri üstünde durulmuştur. 
Sonuç olarak, yazılım güvenliğinin etkin olarak sağlanabilmesi için, güvenliğin 
bütün yaşam süreci evrelerinde ele alınması gerekliliği gösterilmiştir. Ayrıca, yaşam 
sürecinin aşamalarından bir çoğuna, daha önce bu kapsamda uygulanmamış olan 
yeni yöntemler önerilmiştir. 
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Developing Secure Software with C and C++: A Different Approach  
SUMMARY 
 
As networked computing penetrates daily life more and more, it becomes more 
common in every level from daily life to automation of government systems. In order 
computing systems to be secure, each and every of their components must be secure, 
too. Software is most important component among those. Each phase of software 
lifecycle must be implemented in a secure fashion. 
This thesis is inspecting lifecycle of software from beginning to the end and aligns 
the new ideas that it is bringing to the lifecycle. After giving necessary background 
information about the subject, new ideas have been presented, examples have been 
given and possible other options have been discussed. During explaining most of the 
subjects, the topics that is considered to be complimentary is either added or referred 
to. Thanks to that, this thesis can be a reference source to projects in different phases 
like implementation and maintenance. Waterfall lifecycle model, which is used 
frequently in software development projects and divides software projects into 
phases as analysis of requirements, design, implementation, verification and 
maintenance, is used as a template in this thesis. 
As new generations of programming languages emerge, adoption of low-level 
languages such as C/C++ and assembly by new students is decreasing. As lack of 
experienced staff shows up itself due to this and other causes, severe vulnerabilities 
are happening in such environments, where developing of secure software is already 
proven to be hard. The fact that majority of current code base in the world is in those 
languages makes the situation even more critical. Although most of the subjects in 
this thesis are programming language independent, C/C++ and assembler language 
problems are especially covered because of the reasons just mentioned. 
As a result, it has been shown that security countermeasures must be taken in all 
phases of software lifecycle in order to ensure high level of security throughout the 
application. Furthermore, new ideas of security countermeasures have been brought 
to many of the phases of software lifecycle. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Motivation 
1.1.1. Connectivity Is Important 
Motivation of this thesis comes from the fact that connectivity gets more important 
everyday and as it becomes an infrastructure for quality of daily life; its 
trustworthiness becomes a more important aspect. 
With globalizing economy, business-to-business relationships extend beyond 
horizons and require high level of connectivity. With different time zones, there is 
always daylight in one corner of the world, keeping servers and applications busy 
7/24. Even shortest amount of downtime causes big financial losses and damage to 
reputation. Trade secrets and sensitive information of customers reside in servers 
those host millions of connections from different (generally unauthenticated and thus 
anonymous) sources. Laws adapt to connectivity era, as well; there are severe 
penalties for irresponsibility of companies resulting in privacy reveal and identity 
thefts. 
With improved battery life and accepted mobile communication standards, 
manufacturers provide mobile devices that offer seamless and continuous 
connectivity to the Internet. Lower priced devices come everyday with richer feature 
sets attracting more and more people to be connected. As these devices become a 
part of life, users depend on them more and more; high levels of robustness and 
reliability are requested even from basic, entry-level devices. Carrying those devices 
always with themselves causes storing increasing amount of private data in those 
devices; privacy protection becomes essential. 
On the sharper edge of technology, people are known only with their digital 
identities; namely their email addresses, domain names, certificates, nicknames. 
Theft of this information turns into identity theft, allowing attacker to impersonate 
innocent and honest people for their illegal activities. 
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1.1.2. There Are New Challenges 
In this connectivity era, hardware and software face new challenges. New challenges 
require new practices and disciplines. On the hardware side, improvements can be 
done more easily. Almost all metrics those define a high quality system can be 
achieved by just spending more money. Dependability can be sustained by buying 
redundancy, which actually ensures high amount of robustness. Security can be 
enforced easily, too; access to hardware is usually limited with regulated access to 
system rooms. Scalability, performance, responsiveness; virtually all of them can be 
acquired by buying more from off-the-shelf components; there is no hard needs for 
trade-offs. 
Software has harder time to take these new challenges. There is no such thing like 
software redundancy; a program is whether running or not. Software is much more 
complex, programs do not have common interfaces, and each one solves completely 
different set of problems. Software is a thought, an idea; it is harder to understand, 
visualize and comprehend. Translation of thought into reality is very hard to measure 
and verify. Because it is impossible to see it, it is also impossible to see byproducts 
of it. All these traits make it harder to implement securely. Unfortunately, software 
security and reliability, thus trustworthiness, cannot be bought with just spending 
more money. 
Up time is very important, attackers hit with denial of service attacks. Privacy is very 
important, attackers hit with network sniffing, man in the middle attacks, backdoors 
(using private APIs) and traffic analysis. There is a new attack with different attack 
vectors everyday, and often with brand new methods and tools. This thesis aims to 
provide developers with new set of information to enable even more secure software 
design and implementation, which helps their brainchild to withstand those (may be 
yet unknown) attacks 
1.1.3. Software Must Be Secure 
All software applications must be secure and trustworthy, because their usage areas, 
their lifetime and motivation of attacker cannot be known in advance. A designer 
thinking as “nobody would bother attacking this software” is most likely in huge 
mistake, because there might be people who is using that software for security 
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critical tasks in the threat of attackers any time in the future, well beyond 
expectations of developers.  
1.2. Definition of the Problem 
Defective code is a piece of code that is not doing its function properly. For instance, 
it is supposed to add two numbers and return the sum; however, it is returning the 
sum incorrectly. On the other hand, security issues are byproducts of otherwise 
perfectly healthy system. Code does more than what it should do. It is possible to say 
that, if it would be guaranteed that nobody would ever exploit a given security 
vulnerability, it is completely harmless and does not effect correct operation of the 
system. Then it would be left unfixed. Since they are byproducts, developers and 
tester should use their imaginations to discover what that byproduct would be. This is 
what makes secure software development so difficult. On the other hand, attackers 
must use their imagination, too. This is what makes never-before-seen creative 
exploits possible. 
Software development technology is a rather new discipline if compared with other 
disciplines like mechanical engineering or civil engineering. Expectations from this 
discipline are advanced very fast. This discipline is now under demand of providing 
very high quality and security to never foreseen amount of people. Immature 
technologies and unprepared systems pose threats to consumers, which is in this case 
millions of people. Threats scale from minor inconveniences to serious reliability and 
security issues that are in prime time news almost weekly.  
Generally speaking, software projects are consumed by far more people than any 
materialistic project (bridges, skyscrapers, space shuttle) in the given time span, 
because it is globally accessible. A single vulnerability leveraged by hackers can 
incapacitate certain tasks in Internet environment globally. Although software 
security threats are not (yet) safety threats like in materialistic, their wide 
applicability justifies efforts in investigation of security countermeasures. 
Especially after year 2000, major software houses have taken important actions to 
prevent attacks, which damages their customers (as persons and as economic 
entities), public in broader perspective and, of course, themselves (as bad reputation). 
Academics started to invest more resources in software security as well, to serve 
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community and technology. Unfortunately, limited time of five years was not 
sufficient and there is still high volume of work that has to be done.  
There has been different approaches to this subject; cookbook style plug-and-play 
solutions, in-depth analysis of just one concept like correct usage of C/C++ “const” 
qualifier are all examples. We think that although all of these researches are valuable 
previous work, they lack an important factor: Harmony and fit into the software 
development lifecycle. Since software is a product, and final outcome depends on the 
processes while bringing it to existence, engineering lifecycle is a very important 
aspect. 
1.3. Purpose of this Thesis 
The purpose of this thesis is stating that focus of security is important in every phase 
of software engineering lifecycle and security vulnerabilities are evitable if correct 
countermeasures are taken.  
This thesis makes people of different roles aware of most severe and common errors 
that can cause security vulnerabilities. Another goal is providing them with a good 
reference of what to pay attention when developing trustworthy applications.  
What distinguishes this thesis from other works previously done about this subject is 
approach to the subject and the new topics that is novel and not covered elsewhere. 
These differentiating factors are explained in the following sections. 
1.3.1. Approach to the Subject 
Designing and implementing high quality software, like every successful engineering 
project, is accomplished with well-defined and monitored methods. Although phases 
usually overlap and iterated, lifecycle of software can be defined basically as 
following phases: 
• Analysis and definition of requirements, 
• Planning, 
• Implementation, 
• Verification, 
• Deployment and 
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• Maintenance 
Security can (and should) be improved in each of these phases, though it is much 
more effective if taken account during earlier phases. This document devotes a 
chapter to each of these parts to stress what to do and not to do in that specific phase 
of lifecycle. 
Although this engineering lifecycle is taught in almost every software engineering 
book, (most popular and widely known works include [12] and [13]. [43] is an online 
article which gives simple overview. [44] is an interesting debate of usage of a 
methodology at all.) and is referred in vast number of articles, unfortunately, none of 
these works give sufficient amount of information about security aspects of each 
steps. This trait makes this thesis unique among other works. 
There are numerous works about security improvements of software projects; 
however, these works have different organizations than this thesis. I think that 
organizing principles in the way of this thesis is more natural, because people think 
of software lifecycle conceptually in that way. In even moderate sized software 
projects, different people take different responsibilities. Formal organization of work 
and responsibilities allows an easy ramp-up for a person who is joined to the team 
recently. It is widely known that new hires pose a high level of security threat 
because of their familiarities and inexperience with the project. Unique organization 
of this work aims reducing, if not completely preventing at all, this actually evitable 
threat. 
There can be criticism about rather limited usage and simplicity of waterfall method. 
It is true that waterfall method is normally too simple to use in larger scale projects’ 
management and engineering. Other more sophisticated methods (CMM, iterative, 
spiral, to name just a few) are generally preferred over waterfall method. However, 
we strongly believe that waterfall method is most natural and easiest to conceptualize 
method of software engineering. Moreover, other methods can easily be abstracted as 
functions of waterfall methodology, which gives that process a universal identity that 
makes it even more important. One last argument can be that developing secure 
software should be thought during education of students; and students (even new 
graduate hires) mostly use waterfall method. 
6 
1.3.2. New Topics 
This thesis brings novel ideas on some topics those have not been published 
previously. In this thesis, there is some information that was available before this 
work; however, this information is presented to establish completeness or to give 
enough background information to base topics on. 
◊ Design Patterns 
Design patterns are widely used in moderate to large-scale software projects. “Gang 
of Four” has presented a very high quality of work [14] to categorize, define and 
discuss most popular and useful design patterns. This work was published back in 
1995, before critical threads of attacks and companies’ initiatives for secure software. 
Therefore, it lacks information about security during usage of those patterns. This 
thesis has a goal to cover this absent information by examining those patterns in that 
point of view. Since design patterns are generally used by moderate to large scale 
projects and security vulnerabilities mostly occur in that size of projects, this 
research presents a good deal of usability in practice, as well. 
◊ Catalog of One Line Code Defects 
Unfortunately, even a single defective code line can pose severe security 
vulnerability that can render whole software into an unreliable, untrustworthy and 
therefore unusable application. Moreover, if this vulnerability is taken advantage of 
with a successful attack, it can result in financial loses and privacy damage. Sadly 
enough, one defective line can have very bad consequences.  
Obviously, software consists of code, which consists of lines. Therefore, preventing 
vulnerabilities at that level is a good start. Of course, there are bugs that is much 
complicated than simple one liners, but that is other topic. All simple bugs must be 
removed, since it is doable with several methods.  
Although several previous works examines samples of those defects, none of them 
are complete. For example, Writing Secure Code [15] has focused information on 
vulnerabilities of only one defective code line; however, it is not a catalog, it misses 
some defects those are actually very common, too. One more drawback of this book 
is that it covers mostly Microsoft Corporation technologies, which can frustrate 
readers that use other technologies. Code Complete [16], on the other hand, has less 
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focused, very distributed coverage on that topic. Giving a good theoretical 
background but lacking of practical samples and focus, it has its own place.  
Moreover, this thesis defines new examples of possible errors along with respective 
preventions. Novel subjects and pragmatic results make this thesis different in that 
perspective, too. 
◊ Usage of Cryptographic Algorithms in Secure Software 
Applied Cryptography [6] makes an outstanding job describing cryptographic 
algorithms and protocols. Unfortunately, that book is not written for software 
development in mind, therefore it lacks some important information, especially about 
application of cryptography and software lifecycle in commercial products. Secure 
Programming Cookbook for C and C++ [18] has practical applications, however it is 
based on a novelty API and it lacks theoretical information. Some information can be 
used as a “cookbook way”, however, this black box plug-and-play approach is 
unsuitable for most of the serious big projects. This thesis, on the other hand, covers 
an important area of cryptography with enough level of theory and its application to 
secure software. That area is “cryptographic modes”, which is very important during 
application of cryptography.  
There are two reasons why this thesis is focused on this subject among others of such 
a broad domain as cryptology. First, a brilliant algorithm can be rendered useless 
and/or insecure with an unsuitable mode. Second, algorithms are developed after 
long research of academicians and there are readily available implementations 
accessible through operating system APIs. However, choosing an encryption mode is 
generally left to designers and developers. They are normally next big decision after 
choosing an encryption algorithm. 
Besides modes, other aspects of design decisions like encryption method (stream 
versus block), compression and general principles are mentioned as well. Although 
that information can also be found on several other works, they are included here for 
the sake of completeness.  
◊ COM Encapsulation as a Security Countermeasure 
COM is a technology that is invented by Microsoft Corporation in late eighties and is 
one of the core functionalities of Windows OS.  It helps encapsulation of 
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functionalities in separate binaries, in an advanced way than DLL’s do. It is a well-
studied subject from implementation and usage point of view. However, COM 
technology can be an instrument that enables software designers to vision more 
secure software. This thesis brings another implementation detail for least privileged 
user principle, which is not covered elsewhere. There are numerous books about 
COM, and generally, these books cover COM security, as well. Nevertheless, least 
privileged user account principle is different from COM security. COM security is 
user authentication to access to the services that COM module serves. Least 
privileged user account, on the other hand, is a design decision to encapsulate tasks 
into user contexts to minimize attack surface and related vulnerability.  
◊ Libraries and their usage are investigated.  
Developers use libraries to increase code reuse and cut from development time. 
Taking advantage of existing functionality is good idea unless that functionality does 
not bring its security threats with it. There is a saying that goes, as “Being able to ask 
is half of knowing.” If developer is not aware of the potential vulnerabilities in the 
libraries that is used, otherwise secure code could be poisoned with external code.  
Aim of this section is not being a substitution for the documentation of those specific 
libraries. Such a goal would be repeating old work and would not provide any useful 
data. Rather, the goal of this work is stressing out deficiencies of some highly 
popular C/C++ libraries. Sometimes, usage of a certain library is unavoidable; this 
work also gives information how to use possibly insecure libraries safely. 
◊ Tools 
Humanity owes to the tools for the advancement of civilization; tools make works 
easier and possible. This assertion is valid for the software engineering, as well. 
Engineers can use tools to build the product faster, more easily and more secure. 
This thesis will provide information about the useful tools that helps making 
software more secure. We are unaware of any related work about this subject in 
academic environments. 
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2. Attacker 
This chapter should be considered as an introduction to the subject. Furthermore, it 
gives background information to develop strategies in following chapters. This is 
important, because no defense strategy can be reliable without knowing the attacker. 
Additionally, motivations of enemies are defined to make designer aware that there 
can be different motivations and virtually nobody is safe without effective 
countermeasures. 
Information about attackers and their motivations are generally not given in works 
related to secure software development. This thesis has this rarely seen attribute and 
makes it therefore unique if other topics are taken account, too. However, [27] is a 
book that is devoted entirely to the physiology of a hacker, and therefore it is a 
recommended reading for individuals, who are in the interest of knowing their 
attackers better. Coverage in this chapter will therefore be limited to background 
information level. 
2.1. Attacker 
Internet brings computers closer, virtually next to each other. Every computer has 
neighbors, both good ones and bad ones. It is impossible to know who next-door 
neighbor is; attackers can be anyone from fourteen-year-old teenager using hacking 
tools he found on the web to the government with all of vast funds and experts.  
Software designers should consider attacker as an anonymous entity with 
• Full knowledge of internals of designed software (since this information can 
be achieved with reverse engineering), 
• Strong (however, maybe yet unknown) motivation, 
• Unlimited desire and patience for breaking into software (since this is correct 
way of thinking, otherwise it would be a very bad and costly underestimate), 
and 
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• Vast amount (finite, yet incomprehensibly huge amount) of computing 
power. 
2.2. Motivation of the Attacker 
Attackers can have different motivations usually leading to monetary (like making 
money) or social gains (like being famous or developing self-respect). Knowledge 
about possible motivations will help developers to understand threats presented in a 
networked environment. 
2.2.1. Monetary Gains 
2.2.1.1. Stealing Money 
Attacker may have discovered a way to transfer funds from a bank directly to an 
account under his control. To accomplish this, he tries to break in the software and 
force it to do what it would not normally do. Although this motivation is most well 
known motivation among public, it is actually not so popular among hackers, 
because of extreme difficulties and risk involved. 
2.2.1.2. Blackmail 
Attacker may have discovered a vulnerability severe enough that might draw interest 
from other attackers. Attacker can blackmail company representatives with releasing 
that specific sensitive information to public domain potentially causing more attacks 
and bad press. He can send some stolen information as a proof of concept.  
2.2.1.3. Ransom 
Attacker may have succeeded stealing information from a company, but information 
itself may not be valuable to attacker. However, this information will be probably 
valuable for someone else and company may want to give ransom money to stop the 
attacker from releasing that information. 
2.2.1.4. As a Job 
Attacker may be doing attacks as a part of his paid job. For instance, he might be 
paid by a company to discover vulnerabilities in competitor products with a hope of 
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causing bad press, reducing sales and eventually increasing its market share and 
profits. Another example can be software security analysts working for government. 
2.2.1.5. Finding a Job 
Attacker may be in hope to be noticed by one of computer security companies and 
being offered a job with high salary. 
2.2.1.6. Stealing CPU Cycles 
There may be a high prized contest, which requires a high amount of computing 
resources. Attacker can write a worm to sneak into millions of computers and make 
them to compute what he wants. Additionally, that computing power can also be 
used to perform a more focused attack to a specific company, possibly with one of 
other motivations described in this section in mind. This can be base of a denial of 
service attack. 
2.2.2. Social Gains 
2.2.2.1. Gaining Self Respect 
Attacker may feel himself better or find satisfaction that he cannot find socially 
elsewhere by proving his intelligence and talents to himself with an accomplishment 
of successful attack. 
2.2.2.2. Giving Message 
Attacker may have a message to declare the world and can seek a path, which 
involves breaking into computers and displaying a message. Contents of message can 
be anything and may range from declaration of love to a loved one to the extent of 
political issues. Besides just showing the message, attacker can decide to do actual 
harm to make message more unforgettable and noticed, better yet mentioned about in 
the evening news on TV. 
2.2.2.3. Being Famous 
Attacker may be in desire gaining social acceptance in hacker communities with 
successful attacks. 
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2.2.3. Other Gains 
2.2.3.1. Military and Armed Forces 
Military would definitely want to decipher tactical and strategically information from 
competitor country forces during wartime and peacetime. 
2.2.3.2. Intelligence Services 
Intelligence services will definitely try to discover more information by learning 
secret data. Since cryptographic algorithms are generally very hard to break because 
of their well studies theoretical background, it will most likely much easier to break 
in computer systems and access plain-text information directly. 
2.2.3.3. Police and Armed Forces 
Police may want to access secret data for evidence, proof and tracing. If suspect is 
using computer for anything related to its crime, it may be worth trying to break into 
software since it can be easier, more subtle and safer than breaking into house 
physically. 
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3. Attacks 
Understanding different kinds of attacks is required to be able to write vulnerability 
free code and develop strategies. Different attack methods are different instruments 
of enemies.  
“Server Side Attacks” section describes attacks for hosts providing a service in a 
hostile environment. Term “server” as used here does not necessarily mean big 
machines with multi CPU’s in cooled system rooms, desktop computers may also 
serve services as well, like peer to peer networking or personal web sites.  
“Client Side Attacks” section describes attacks for hosts consuming some sort of 
service from a hostile server or from a legitimate server used as a leverage to redirect 
client to a hostile server. When an administrator of a server starts browsing a popular 
site, the machine becomes a client machine and thus vulnerable to client side attacks. 
This chapter also gives examples of actual attacks. Attacks are chosen among others 
with the criteria of being widely known and having high damage. 
3.1. Server Side Attacks 
3.1.1. Introduction  
Since servers are shared among many people, even one successful attack to a single 
server causes broader damage to public and more gain to attacker. Therefore, they 
are generally more popular and better known. Attackers usually prefer directed or 
common attacks to servers rather than attacking to clients individually, because of 
possible higher-profit outcome. 
3.1.2. Sample Attacks 
Sample attacks from the near past are listed below as examples: 
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◊ Reportedly, nineteen-year-old Russian called Maxim stolen credit card, address 
information and other private data of some 300.000 customers, and wanted $100.000 
ransom [2]. 
◊ Code Red infected servers running Microsoft IIS server on Windows 2000. Cost is 
estimated over $2 billion. It clogged network bandwidth, allowed attackers to take 
control of servers, and caused information theft. [3] 
◊ MyDoom [4] worm infected more than one million computers worldwide. It was 
responsible 20% of email messages sent globally at that time (Jan 2004). It has 
slowed down internet more than 50 percent and made DoS attacks to some 
companies including Microsoft, Google, AltaVista, Lycos and SCO, causing SCO to 
change its domain name. Estimates are that MyDoom has caused $40 billion in 
economic damage. 
◊ Two buffer overflows (one heap and the other stack) in name resolution service of 
Microsoft SQL Server 2000 caused security vulnerabilities. Those vulnerabilities are 
exploited by Slammer worm and at least 22.000 servers are affected by it. [19] 
◊ Blaster worm [20] [21] took advantage of buffer overflow in DCOM remote 
activation implemented in RPCSS.DLL in all major versions of Microsoft Windows 
including 2000, XP and Server 2003 allowing remote attacker to run arbitrary code 
in the context “Local System” account. That account is one of the most powerful 
accounts in MS Windows OS, it could do possibly anything that an administrator 
could do on the system console. 
3.1.3. Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks 
Denial of service attacks are designed to interrupt service provided by servers 
connected to Internet. It has three major mechanisms.  
◊ Attacker Consumes Network Resources 
Attacker sends extensive amount of network packets to the server where packet 
contents are not important and just consume bandwidth. Sending hundreds of 
thousands of PING packets can be an example for such an attack. This kind of attack 
must be stopped on network devices like intelligent routers, firewalls, or intrusion 
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detection systems (IDS); or by ISP’s. They are not security vulnerabilities of 
software. 
◊ Attacker Uses Server Resources 
Attacker sends low cost high impact packets to the server. TCP servers can be 
attacked by sending large numbers of TCP-SYN packets (only 40 bytes with IP 
header) each causing server to prepare for a TCP connection and allocate resources. 
For UDP servers, attacker can send a large number of requests for a time consuming 
service (like authentication). These kinds of attacks can be detected by intrusion 
detection systems (IDS) and may be prevented with proper reconfiguration of 
network devices. However, application programmer can take countermeasures to 
reduce the chance of successful attacks. 
◊ Attacker Crashes Server 
Attacker manages to discover a vulnerability of the server application. He sends a 
specially crafted packet to the system, either causing server to allocate extensive 
amount of resources finally bringing it down or crashing (maybe because of a general 
protection error caused by a buffer overflow, which is possibly caused by an integer 
overflow) instantly. This kind of attack is almost impossible to detect by IDSs, at 
least before updating detection engine on the IDS with the signature of that specific 
attack. Application programmers are responsible and accountable for attacks 
resulting in server crash. 
DoS attacks can be used as a leverage for attacks that are more sophisticated; for 
example by keeping IDS busy and hiding password-guessing attacks among other 
packets. 
DoS attacks may be performed distributed by multiple hosts; this is then called 
Distributed DoS, or DDoS. This type makes it even harder to detect attacker and to 
prevent attacks. Attacker first writes a virus and infects computers of normally 
legitimate users. After a sufficient amount of time to spread around, it triggers attack 
and thousands of hosts globally attacks to a specific server. While DoS attack can 
stopped easily by modifying IP access control lists on the routers or firewalls, 
preventing DDoS with that method is impossible because of high amplitude of 
hostile connections. 
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3.1.4. Remote Code Execution 
This attack is most frightening type of attacks. It allows attacker to gain complete 
user rights as the user context that the infected program is running in. If the user 
happens to be administrator, attacker practically owns remote computer and can 
make it to do everything he or she wants.  
This type of attack uses buffer overruns (simple buffer overruns, buffer overruns 
caused by integer overflows or internal state confusion) and gets more effective as 
the user context of the attacked program gets more privileged. 
Worms are generally used to make spreading more effective. A worm is a malicious 
program that enters into a system from a security hole (like the ones caused by 
different flavors of buffer overruns). After infection, it generally tries to spread itself 
to other systems by probing network and sending specially crafted network packages 
(generally same packet is used to sneak into other systems). 
3.1.5. Server Hijacking 
This form of attack is generally performed locally by a malicious administrator. 
Legitimate server application is replaced with similar looking malicious one in the 
hope of collecting sensitive user information. In some forms, legitimate server 
continues to run along with malicious software (malware) and report its status as 
okay. 
The malware does not have to be full-blown implementation of legitimate server 
application; generally, only front end is implemented. After users reveal their 
account information, server responds with a report of some internal server error 
advising to try again a few minutes later, rather than showing incorrect information 
and making users to suspect. 
Most popular methods are completely replacing application; installing malformed 
one with TCP binding hijacking; redirecting user requests with network equipment or 
with configuration in server (such as in TACACS+ “Follow” command). 
3.1.6. SQL Poisoning 
SQL poisoning is an attack that is performed by supplying server application input 
parameters, which actually conceal harmful SQL commands. An application lacking 
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proper input validation will use those parameters while building SQL query, which 
turns into a harmful SQL command. A very simple example can be as follows: 
Assume that developer checks authenticity of the users with a SQL statement that is 
constructed with following C code: 
1 sprintf( 
2  szFinalQueryString,  
3  “select count(*) from accounts where” 
4  “ username='%1' and” 
5  “ password='%2'”, 
6  szInputParameterUserName, 
7  szInputParameterPassword; 
Figure 3.1: Sample code for SQL poisoning 
 
A user supplying username as “some string’ or 1=1 --” and password as any “some 
string” will gain access to the server no matter if there is an account or not. After 
construction, resulting string will be 
8 select count(*) from accounts where username='some_string’ or 
1=1  
9 --' or 1=1; #and password='some_string' 
Figure 3.2: Resulting SQL command of sample SQL poisoning code 
 
As seen above, Line 9 is completely an SQL comment, since “--“ is SQL comment 
delimiter.  
More harmful attacks can drop tables, delete databases or, in the worst case reveal 
user information. There is a high quality previous work in this area. Therefore, 
preventions of SQL poisoning will not be discussed in this thesis. [27], for instance 
has a good deal of information about Microsoft Corporation SQL Server security, 
and it covers SQL poisoning, too. 
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3.2. Client Side Attacks 
3.2.1. Introduction 
Client computers are generally administrated by people who are less knowledgeable 
in computing systems administration than the administrators of servers. Therefore, 
client side attacks, differently than server side attacks, generally depend on lack of 
knowledge of users. 
3.2.2. Sample Attacks 
Below can be found sample successful attacks from near past. 
◊ Melissa Worm infected computers with malicious Microsoft Word documents in 
some versions of Microsoft Word application. It has impersonated users and sent 
their private data as attachments to the contacts extracted from their computer. It also 
deleted some critical system files. [5] 
◊ “I love you” virus, appearing in May 2000, sent mail messages to every contact 
extracted from infected computer with the subject line “ILOVEYOU” and a 
VBScript attachment. It caused email traffic blockage and an estimated economical 
damage of $10 billion.  
◊ SoBig worm [22], released in August 2003, is a trojan which is spread to contacts 
extracted from infected computers via attachment in an email and caused high 
volume of malicious traffic in Internet, blocking legitimate traffic. It has caused a 
high amount of financial lose and inconvenience [23]. 
3.2.3. Trojan Horses 
Abbreviated incorrectly to trojan, its name comes from historic Trojan Horse and 
designates a type of attacks where malicious software is buried into seemingly 
harmless useful software. Once the user is convinced to run the program, malicious 
part of the software becomes active and does its harm. They generally install a root 
kit to open a back door to the infected system, log key strokes possibly to learn 
passwords and other private information; all of them to impersonate user.  
A “Root Kit” is a piece of software that runs in kernel mode and becomes part of 
operating system, which means that it becomes part of trusted computing base 
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(TCB). In theory, it is possible to create a root kit that is impossible to be detected or 
removed. It can trap, redirect and modify system calls and their return values, change 
scheduling and inter-process communication; in shorter words, everything that an 
operating system can. This can be considered as a perfect camouflage. 
Systems can be protected in three ways against these attacks: First, there can be virus 
protection software that detect suspicious activity before it happens. New viruses can 
work around this. Second, all software can be digitally signed by the original 
manufacturer. If the contents of package are tampered with, signature will mismatch 
and operating system will detect. Attackers still can write their own software and 
even sign it. However, it is very difficult to convince a well-known root certificate 
authority to sign their certificates. Attacker can setup its own CA; but this will 
generate “Not trusted CA” warning. Nevertheless, this time, user might not 
understand what all of this jargon is and just choose running software. To mitigate 
this case, second, a more general strategy can be used: running the system as a non-
administrator account. It will be harder to infect systems. Even if the system is 
infected, potential of the harm will be limited since the attack surface will be much 
smaller. For example, non-administrator accounts in Microsoft Windows cannot 
install kernel mode drivers, which makes root kit installation impossible (unless there 
is vulnerability in Windows OS itself, of course). 
3.2.4. Viruses 
Viruses are very similar to trojans, with one difference that they are designed to 
spread themselves and try to infect other computers aggressively.  
3.2.5. Cross Side Scripting (XSS) 
Cross side scripting is a form of attack that is performed by putting malicious scripts 
in a trustworthy context and deceiving people to run them. For example, an attacker 
can supply a comment with a client-side script buried inside to a blog site. Visitors of 
that site will run this script in the context of that site. Script can ask for username and 
password, or alternatively steal session cookie, and send those information back to 
the attacker.  
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3.2.6. Phising 
Being a subcategory of social engineering, phising is requesting sensitive 
information from users by deceiving them as such requests come from legitimate 
representatives. Attackers send official looking mail messages to users and try to 
convince them to reveal their personal information by claiming that there is some 
problem with their account. The mail further says that by clicking a link in the mail 
and entering user info will solve that problem. Client following directions from those 
mails end up in hostile web sites those steals their password. 
Some phising methods include URL spoofing like using complicated IP addresses 
which regular users will not understand its destination or using fake domain names 
similar to official ones as in http://www.hotmail-supersecure.com or 
http://www.hotmai1.com (please note numeric one “1” at the end). Even appearance 
can be forged to be same, for example, http://www.hotmail.com has Cyrillic letters 
such as “o” and “m” as it results in different domain name thanks to Unicode DNS 
system. Using details of Internet URI resolution (as in 
http://www.bankofamerica.com@www.hostile.com) is another method. Other 
phising methods use fake mail messages with malicious software as the attachment 
convincing clients that they are coming from trusted contacts. 
Phishers exploit deception of human mind, not security vulnerabilities in software. 
However, software can be designed to protect users from deception by warning them 
against possible threats. This thesis does not cover countermeasures for phising 
attacks, as they are not directly related to code defects. Sound design principles must 
be followed to prevent phising from happening. Readers are urged to refer to [24] for 
preventing misuse and false security sense of two-way authentication mechanism. 
[25] presents US-CERT report and unfortunately, as of March 2005, there is a trend 
of 26% increase in phising attacks. [26] and [27] are good resources for more 
information about social engineering. Especially Chapter 10 in [27], “Social 
Engineers -How They Work and How to Stop Them”, is a good introduction to the 
subject. 
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4. Requirement Analysis 
4.1. Motivation 
Basic principle in requirement analysis of a secure system is defining requirements 
precisely to ensure that only required features are added to the list, this ensures 
keeping attack surface small. For instance, if dynamic update from the network 
feature is not required, adding that feature increases opportunities for attackers 
unnecessarily.  
Another very important analysis during this phase is security needs of the product. 
Who is the audience of this product? What are the security-usability trade-offs that 
can be made? These decisions play a very important role in the overall security of the 
system.  
4.2. Previous Work 
Waterfall methodology approach revealed that requirement analysis phase is 
researched very well since it is one of the main aspects of software engineering and 
many other engineering disciplines as well. We have nothing to add novel to this area 
of software development life cycle.  
Researches are encouraged to investigate opportunities in requirement analysis 
phase, which allows programs to be safer in the meaning of their existence. 
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5. Design 
5.1. Motivation 
A good and secure design is key element of secure computing. A trustworthy 
computing system must be “secure by design”. Insecure designs are almost 
impossible to retrofit with security features later to make them completely secure; 
there will always be an attack, may to be yet discovered.  
5.2. Previous work 
Designing high quality software involves a very broad range of subjects. This thesis 
does not repeat rich previous in this vast area; rather it presents important subjects 
that are not previously worked on, at least in this context. Motivation on that subject 
and previous work are detailed at the beginning of each subject. 
5.3. Tight Tunnel 
We define tight tunnel as an execution path with minimal unexpected paths. 
Surprises are disastrous in software; therefore tight tunnel operation is crucial in 
software systems.   
5.3.1. Motivation 
Programmers must be very precise when ordering commands to computers, because 
computers do not have commonsense like people do. In normal life, scope and 
applicability of the commands and rules can be obvious. In the realm of computers, 
everything and anything must be set in order precisely to prevent possible gaps in the 
interpretation. Unfortunately, ensuring a tight tunnel for each possible execution path 
is a difficult task in software project. This can mostly be achieved in design phase 
and therefore it is handled in this chapter. 
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5.3.2. Previous Work 
Steve McConnel’s book [16] makes a great job in defining principles of good code 
development. Although that book has vast information in overall quality of design 
and development, it does not have information in the context that is presented here. 
[52] is another popular book which gives information about best practices in 
development. However, that book, too, lacks of information about design decisions 
of code structure. There is not academic article about this subject that we are aware 
of. 
5.3.3. Concept 
Code must be designed to flow in tightest tunnel possible. What is meant here is that 
code execution must be restricted with language and operating system features to the 
maximum point as much as possible. Examples, which are sorted from low to high 
level, are below: 
• Variables should be declared  
o as const if they will not be modified later 
o appropriate in size, not larger or smaller than needed 
o as unsigned if signed operations are not needed (Counter are 
especially candidates for unsigned integers) 
o with minimum visibility to outside (usage of namespaces and 
public/private namespaces is recommended) 
• Functions should be declared 
o with parameters that complies with principles of variable declarations 
and supports clear “in” and “out” parameters 
o as const, if they will not directly or indirectly (via non-const function 
calls) modify member variables later. Type casting or mutable 
declarations can be considered. 
o with minimum number of overloaded variations 
o as reusable and as generic as possible 
o with throw specification if possible 
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o with minimum visibility to outside (usage of namespaces and 
public/private namespaces is recommended. Private / Protected 
difference should be respected and Private should be preferred over 
Protected to prevent derived class namespace bloat.) 
o with consistent error handling, using exceptions of some standard type 
for all error reporting is highly encouraged.  
o Functions that are not returning at all should be declared as 
__declspec(noreturn) (Microsoft Corporation C/C++ compiler) or 
__attribute__((noreturn)) (GNU GCC) 
• Classes should be declared 
o with minimum number of inheritances 
o with parameters that complies to variable declaration principles 
o with functions that complies to function declaration principles 
o with minimum number of constructors with maximum number of 
default parameters possible 
o by hiding unused constructors as privates to prevent copying etc. 
o with minimum number of friend functions possible 
o with minimum number of casting operators possible 
o with minimum visibility to outside (usage of namespaces and 
public/private namespaces is recommended) 
Regarding these guidelines can prevent many of the bugs by detecting them at the 
compile time. Another note is that C++ compilers support these principles as a part 
of standard. Preferring C++ to C can be rewarding even if no object-oriented design 
is targeted. 
5.3.4. Advanced Topics 
Tight tunnel is not just variable, function and class declarations, the concept involve 
more. Data flow, for instance must be also in a tight tunnel. This means that designer 
should design interfaces in a way that all of them use same type of data (only meters, 
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not centimeters or kilometers, for instance). This allows data to remain in the same 
meaning throughout the execution process.  
Another important aspect is that function names and variable names must be declared 
and used consistently so that programmer mindset stays tuned to only one kind of 
standard. Pre-pending function names or grouping them in namespaces is therefore a 
good idea. It keeps less and clearer choices to the programmer to select from, which 
of course results in tighter path for execution. 
5.3.5. Examples 
For instance, if these guidelines would be followed, following bug from latest Linux 
kernel at the time of writing would be discovered much earlier than it was, because 
compiler would have warned against signed-unsigned mismatch [51]: 
Date:   Wed Aug 3 18:43:22 2005 -0700 
 [PATCH] sys_set_mempolicy() doesn’t check if mode < 0 
 A kernel BUG () is triggered by a call to set_mempolicy () with a negative first argument. 
This is because the mode is declared as an int, and the validity check does not check < 0 
values 
 
Similarly, following bug could have been prevented if GCC dictates tight tunnel 
principle better [51]. Explanation of the bug is inside the cited text: 
Date:   Tue Jun 28 20:45:06 2005 -0700 Variable "c" was declared as an unsigned int,  
but used in: 
 [PATCH] coverity: i386: build.c: negative return to unsigned fix 
    125    for (i=0 ; (c=read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)))>0 ; i+=c ) 
    126     if (write(1, buf, c) != c) 
    127      die("Write call failed"); 
 (akpm: read() can return -1.  If it does, we fill the disk up with garbage). 
 
Another tight tunnel problem with GCC is following comments from same thread 
[51]: 
Date:   Thu Aug 18 14:40:00 2005 -0700 
[IA64] remove unused function __ia64_get_io_port_base 
Not only was this unused, but its somewhat eccentric declaration of "static inline const 
unsigned long" gives gcc4 heartburn. 
 
These and other examples imply that tight tunnel principle is not in common practice 
in the degree as it should be. Potential cause for this can be lack of knowledge among 
developers. 
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Additional disrespect to tight tunnel from same change log is seen below. GCC 
should have warned comparison between signed and unsigned variables. 
Date:   Thu Aug 4 19:52:03 2005 -0700 
[PATCH] __vm_enough_memory() signedness fix 
…     
 We hunted down the problem to this: 
The deferred update mecanism used in vm_acct_memory(), on a SMP system,  allows the 
vm_committed_space counter to have a negative value. This should not be a problem since 
this counter is known to be inaccurate. 
But in __vm_enough_memory() this counter is compared to the `allowed' variable, which is 
an unsigned long.  This comparison is broken since it will consider the negative values of 
vm_committed_space to be huge positive values, resulting in a memory allocation failure. 
 
Tight tunnel is not only useful in security but also in optimizations. If compiler 
precisely knows what is exactly intended to be done, then it can optimize code 
accordingly. Below is an example: 
Date:   Tue Jun 21 17:14:55 2005 -0700 
[PATCH] __read_page_state(): pass unsigned long instead of unsigned 
By making the offset argument of __read_page_state an unsigned long instead of unsigned, 
we can avoid forcing the compiler to sign extend a usually constant argument. This saves 1 
instruction on x86-64. 
 
5.4. Design Patterns 
This section analyses selected design patterns from a security point of view. Design 
patterns are selected from famous pattern catalog “Design Patterns” of Erich Gamma 
et al [14]. Selection of patterns made by their popularity and whether they have an 
important aspect of security or not. 
5.4.1. Motivation 
Design patterns are used all over the world for different software projects, since it 
makes understanding of the project design easier and universal. Moreover, if used 
correctly, design patterns result in more manageable and easier to implement design. 
As people use words in their sentences to describe something, patterns help 
describing internals of software design.  
Examining design patterns deeply reveal that they have different security wise 
aspects, which are very important to build trustworthy applications. Some of the 
patterns add inherited robust design that results in more secure code, while others 
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pose some threats that should be mitigated in order to use that pattern safely. Since 
design patterns are in wide use, describing those aspects are very important. 
It is important to note that this work not only discusses weaknesses of existing 
patterns, but also it extends their use where applicable. 
5.4.2. Previous Work 
There are numerous articles and books about design patterns and about best practices 
to use them. Unfortunately, those resources fall short to define security aspect of the 
patterns. There are articles that define brand new patterns for security related 
applications, however this does not help using old and more commonly used patterns 
in a secure fashion. At the time of this writing, this work is the only one about this 
subject. 
5.4.3. Creational Patterns 
5.4.3.1. Prototype 
This pattern is very useful to reduce class count, thus complexity. Moreover, it helps 
code reuse, which is a good trait for secure software since it decreases the number of 
lines where a code defect can be introduced into the code. Code reuse helps 
furthermore by increasing test coverage. Therefore, this pattern is highly 
recommended for class hierarchies with similar classes. 
Major concern is that abstract classes only define interfaces, and interface level 
agreement does not guarantee implementation level compatibility. In this pattern, 
there is one interface pointer, which can actually point to one of multiple concrete 
classes that are unknown at the runtime. If implementations of those concrete classes 
are incompatible, bad consequences can scale up to buffer overruns. To prevent this 
from happening, interfaces must be designed very clearly, with only required 
parameters in the same meanings (please visit previous section for further discussion 
about tight tunnel principles). Although it can be considered paranoiac, minimizing 
(or eliminating if possible) usage of pointers, especially the ones that are passed to 
other classes, is safer way to go. 
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10 //*************************************************** 
11 //*************************************************** 
12 class String { 
13 private: 
14  char * pStr; 
15 public: 
16  char * Set(char *pStr) = 0; 
17  char * Get() = 0; 
18  int GetLength() = 0; 
19  ... 
20 }; 
21  
22 //*************************************************** 
23 //*************************************************** 
24 class UppercaseString { 
25  char * Set(char *pStr) { } 
26  char * Get() { } 
27  
28  int GetLength() { 
29   int iLength; 
30   char * pItr = pStr; 
31   for (  
32    iLength = 0; 
33    *pItr != 0; 
34    ++iLength, ++pItr); 
35   return iLength; } 
36 }; 
37  
38 //*************************************************** 
39 //*************************************************** 
40 class LowercaseString { 
41  char * Set(char *pStr) { } 
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42  char * Get() { } 
43  
44  int GetLength() { 
45   int iLength; 
46   char * pItr = pStr; 
47   for ( 
48    iLength = 0;  
49    *pItr != (char)-1;  
50    ++iLength, ++pItr); 
51   return iLength; } 
52 } 
Figure 5.1: Prototype Pattern Misuse Code 
 
Above is a demonstration of mismatched prototype implementation. Example is very 
simple and provided only as proof of concept: One string represents end of string 
with (-1) while other represents with NUL. In real world scenarios, classes will be 
much more complicated and much harder to test.  
5.4.3.2. Factory Method 
This popular pattern (that is used by COM feature of Microsoft Windows operating 
systems.) is a variation of prototype pattern. Same concerns are also applicable to 
this one. This pattern has some advantages of its own, as described next paragraph. 
Normally, classes are configured for each user and than attached to the user context. 
This approach brings state and configuration data to classes, which is not very 
desirable. If there is a small amount of user types, there can be several subclasses. A 
factory method can create a custom class according to user type. These “hardwired” 
concrete classes will be playing one well-defined role, thus making implementation 
easier (and therefore safer). 
For an example, please see following code. Let us assume that in an application, 
there are two types of users: “NormalUser” and “SuperUser”. Normal users can read 
the files, where super users can also write them. A straightforward approach could be 
having a Boolean member variable, which holds user type. Then, write function call 
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can check for this variable and perform appropriate operation. However, this 
approach is not good. First, function implementations get more complex. Second, 
keeping state information can be difficult and error prone. Finally, a stack smashing 
attack can easily change this member variable value and can elevate itself to a more 
privileged user account. A better approach is “hardwiring” functions to their users. 
This approach scales better with higher number of functions.  
Below is an example implementation of program with two user types. Since there 
can be a very high number of subclasses, designer may want to incorporate other 
patterns to make development a bit easier by allowing code reuse among subclasses. 
5.4.3.3. Abstract Factory 
This pattern is very similar to previous pattern; it can be considered as a classed 
version of factory method. Concerns and advantages are practically the same. 
 
53 //*************************************************** 
54 //*************************************************** 
55 class User { 
56 public: 
57  void ReadFile(...) { 
58   System->ReadFile(...); 
59  void WriteFile(...) = 0; 
60 }; 
61   
62 //*************************************************** 
63 //*************************************************** 
64 class NormalUser : public User { 
65 private: 
66  ... 
67 public: 
68  void TruncateFile(...) { 
69   throw “Access Denied!”; } 
70  Void WriteFile(...) { 
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71   throw “Access Denied!”; } 
72 }; 
73  
74 //*************************************************** 
75 //*************************************************** 
76 class SuperUser : public User { 
77 private: 
78  ... 
79 public: 
80  void TruncateFile(...) { 
81   System->TruncateFile(...); } 
82  Void WriteFile(...) { 
83   System->WriteFile(...); } 
84 }; 
85  
86 User * NewUser(bool fIsSuper) { 
87  return (fIsSuper ? new SuperUser : new NormalUser); } 
Figure 5.2: Factory Method Usage Example 
 
5.4.4. Structural Patterns 
5.4.4.1. Adapter 
This pattern has an usage that is not mentioned in “Design Patterns”. Besides other 
usage areas, adapters can be used when accessing insecure legacy functionality. 
Assume that there is a module, which provides a useful functionality that is time 
and/or money consuming to re-implement. However, it is designed in an insecure 
fashion (most probably because it is old and implemented before security 
awareness). Directly using that functionality can result in insecure application. If 
there is an adapter class, though, it can make all access checks, verification, 
authentication, authorization, accounting and all other types of filtering before 
passing those parameters to insecure parts. Moreover, it can use overwrite protected 
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heap memory (piece of memory that ends at the boundary of write denied page.) for 
“OUT” parameters.  
Adapters can also be used as wrappers around old style C functions (most notably C 
runtime library) that do not have parameters to pass buffer sizes. This type of class 
would be more likely to be a wrapper class, though. 
There might be consequences that adapter classes modify their input parameters. 
This is normally undesired because it can result in incompatibilities among classes. 
Adaptors can create their own copies, but this is undesirable because of performance 
reasons. There must be a good design decision on how much adapting and 
manipulation of an adapter is allowed to do. Readers are urged to refer to discussions 
in Design Patterns [14]. Another useful discussion can be found on Chapter 7: Field 
Notes of [29]. 
5.4.4.2. Bridge 
Basic structure can be summarized as below. Essentially, classes A, B, C are using 
an abstract class bridge, which points to one of multiple implementation options. 
Classes A, B, C can be inherited from “Class Bridge”, too. 
 
Figure 5.3: Bridge Pattern Structure 
 
As discussed very well and detailed on [14], this pattern should be used where more 
than one infrastructure is going to be used. (Different infrastructures are encapsulated 
in ClassImp1 and ClassImp2.) This encourages code reuse highly. What make this 
pattern interesting from security point of view are platform dependent data type sizes 
and OS specific API’s. ClassImp1 and 2 can be implementing classes for different 
architectures or platforms. This is transparent to upper level classes and encapsulated 
in Class Bridge. This significantly increases code reuse and simplifies design. 
Class B Class C 
Class Bridge 
Class A 
ClassImp1 ClassImp2 
Or 
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Static code analyzer tools like the one mentioned on [19], [30] is used during 
verification phase while porting software among platforms. However, this approach 
is different than using this pattern. First, these tools are designed for legacy 
applications and for retrofitting them with new security features, whereas this pattern 
should be used when starting a new project that must support different platforms and 
architectures to begin with. Second, such tools normally modify source code; large 
code bases modified based on some automatic tool recommendations can be scary if 
there are subtle bugs in the tool. Moreover, added source code makes runtime 
performance slower, which can discourage usage of harder encryption algorithms 
(which are very CPU intensive) or just fall below specification document. For 
instance, [30] can add to execution time up to thirty times of normal time. Finally, 
and most importantly, these tools are mostly used for detection of machine 
limitations and overflows, where this pattern could be supporting different platforms. 
Furthermore, capabilities are much broader with this pattern in a manner that this 
pattern supports also proprietary assembly instructions or API calls. 
5.4.4.3. Decorator 
No matter how much designers plan for possible features of products, there may be 
always requests in the future, which the product is not designed to accommodate. 
Then, designers and developers (who are usually different people than the original 
team) must modify the product. Each modification can add regressions and 
dangerous bugs into the code.  
Decorator pattern allows projects to expand, as they need to. Therefore, this pattern 
should be used for pieces of code, where designers want to leave room for future 
growth or they are not sure of future requirements. Usage of this pattern is an 
investment in “Maintenance” phase of waterfall method. 
5.4.4.4. Façade 
This is another very useful pattern to prevent complexity, which is number one 
enemy of secure software. If a program depends on interfaces that are overly detailed 
and unnecessarily complex, designers can settle on a higher-level simpler interface 
and let this class translate these simple requests into series of complicated steps. At 
the extreme point, façade pattern can be compared to functions in programming 
languages; they both encapsulate a complicated process into a well-defined simple 
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interface. This interface then serves as universal interface to its users. A sample 
diagram of this pattern can be seen below. 
 
Figure 5.4: Facade Pattern Structure 
 
This pattern is more useful if Façade class is used by more than one class since 
following complexity gets more difficult with more references. 
5.4.4.5. Proxy 
[14] Describes the difference between Proxy and Adapter pattern very well. As 
summary, adapter is used to change behavior of otherwise incompatible class 
interfaces whereas proxy is used to perform additional operations with the same 
interface. Still, from security point of view, these two patterns present similar traits 
and discussion about adapter is valid for this pattern as well. However, proxy has one 
more usage in that it enables additional AAA functionalities, namely Authentication, 
Authorization and Accounting.  
AAA functionalities can be added easily with usage of Proxy: only thing to do is 
deriving proxy class from main class, overriding its member functions and adding 
required AAA functionality. This approach will not break clients (provided that they 
are referring to the main class over a pointer) and will not require any modification to 
the main class, which prevents regressions. 
Class B Class C 
Facade 
Class A 
Class That 
Class Other 
Class Extern Class This 
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88 TimeClass gTime; 
89 SystemClass gSystem; 
90  
91 //**************************************************** 
92 //**************************************************** 
93 class FileSystem { 
94 private: 
95  ... 
96 public: 
97  void CreateFile(...) { ... } 
98  void DeleteFile(...) { ... } 
99  void ReadFile(...) { ... } 
100  void WriteFile(...) { ... } 
101  ... 
102 }; 
103  
104 //**************************************************** 
105 //**************************************************** 
106 class FileSystemProxy : public FileSystem { 
107 private: 
108  LoggerClass _Logger; 
109 public: 
110  void CreateFile(...) {  
111   FileSystem::CreateFile(...); 
112   _Logger.LogCreation( 
113  
114    gTime.GetCurrentTime(),  
115    gSystem.GetUser()) ); } 
116 }; 
Figure 5.5: Proxy Pattern Example 
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A simple demonstration of retrofitted accounting functionality to an existing file 
system class can be found above. 
5.5. Encryption 
Encryption is a very sensitive and generally less understood part of design. Doing it 
right requires a very good theoretical background and deep knowledge of 
mathematics and number theory. It is very hard to tell if scrambled bytes really 
protect the data and from which kind of threats it protects. Can it resists dictionary 
attack, brute force attack, differential analysis, known plain text and cipher-text 
attacks and replay attacks?  
This chapter gives information for developers who have responsibility of making 
good security design decisions. Practices mentioned here will make software more 
resilient to attacks. 
5.5.1. Motivation 
Encryption algorithms are after all mathematical calculations using mathematical 
traits of some mathematical operations. It is not wise to tamper with the algorithms in 
search for better ones. It is easy to make an algorithm less secure when it is not 
known what the effects are. At the other times, it is well possible not to reach desired 
security; though the designer thinks he did so, security traits might not have been 
changed at all. Using double encryption wrong way with a block algorithm can be an 
example.  
A developer obliged to use an algorithm with shorter keys may try to double the key 
size by encrypting the message two times with different keys. 
Cipher-text = Encrypt with Key2 (Encrypt with Key1 (Message)) 
However, according Schneier in [6], if the algorithm is group, then there is always a 
Key3 such that 
Cipher-text = Encrypt with Key2 (Encrypt with Key1 (Message)) = Encrypt with Key3 
(Message) 
Thus rendering effective key length to half, namely unchanged. Designing security 
with false sense of having 2n bits key length despite the fact having only n bits key 
length would be catastrophic. Even if this is not the case, Merkle and Hellman 
developed a method called meet-in-the-middle (MITM) to reduce attempt count from 
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22n to 2n+1. [31] is simple definition for MITM. [32] is the original article that 
discusses MITM. 
There are triple key methods to increase key length and security. Here,  
Cipher-text = Encrypt with Key1 (Decrypt With Key2 (Encrypt with Key1 (Message))) 
Effective key length is 2n bits. However, many crypto analysts have shown that there 
could be still vulnerabilities [6].  
As seen here, cryptology is very sensitive to external modifications. It is easy to have 
a false sense of security while it is difficult to build a real one. This work focuses on 
usage of encryption algorithms. First, software designers do not design their 
algorithms; they rather use existing and well studied public algorithms. Focusing on 
quality algorithm development should be work of another article that aims 
advancement in bottom layers of cryptology. Second, even a perfect algorithm can be 
turned into a weak one by using it improperly. Third, with even stronger encryption 
algorithms, weakest link is being shifted to other areas. Now, traffic analysis is one 
of the emerging threats for secure communications. 
As a summary, motivation of this section comes from idea that correct usage of 
crypto algorithms unleashes full potential and prevents weaknesses.  
5.5.2. Previous Work 
Cryptology, thanks to its mathematics nature, is one of the most studied and 
advanced sciences in computer technology. There have been numerous works on 
algorithm design and powerful algorithms since the beginning of 20th century. 
However, there is a lack of connection between mathematical theory and its usage in 
software projects. This thesis aims to close this gap by providing information on 
cryptographic modes.  
5.5.3. Background Information: Cipher Types 
5.5.3.1. Stream Ciphers 
Stream ciphers have key stream generators that output a temporary second key for 
next bit to be encrypted. Structure can be illustrated as follows: 
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Figure 5.6: Reference model for stream ciphers 
 
All security depends on the quality of generator. If it outputs predictable and routine 
stream of keys, it will be easy to break the cipher-text. On the other hand, it outputs 
seemingly random key bits with infinite period; attacker cannot break cipher-text 
without knowledge of key. 
There are two kinds of stream ciphers: Self-synchronizing and synchronous. 
◊ Synchronous 
Synchronous stream ciphers have a key stream generator, which synchronizes itself 
with master key and then generates seemingly random key stream.  
Since previous cipher-text output and plain text input does not influence key stream 
generation, bit flips do not cause error extension, only flipped bit will be affected in 
plain text; corresponding bit in plain text will be flipped, too. Designers must 
incorporate some sort of message integrity checking to their protocols, otherwise 
blindly flipping cipher-text bits will turn into a successful attack. Bit losses from or 
insertions to cipher-text will break alignment of decryption and will cause damaged 
decryption there.  
Same key stream should not be used to encrypt different plain-text messages. Since 
key stream depends only on master key, using same master key will result in same 
key stream; there is no way to safely resynchronize key stream and encrypt even 
different plain-texts with that key stream. Applications should be designed in a way 
that avoids resynchronization of key stream. If that is unavoidable, new master key 
must be used to ensure security.  
To decrypt nth bit of cipher-text, key stream generator must be run to produce “n-1” 
bits of key stream (which will not be used). With larger cipher-text, this can be 
Ge Kn Pn
Cn
Master Key 
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severe performance penalty. Moreover, encryption cannot be parallelized because of 
this dependency. However, using different channels (for example channel number 
one encrypts every odd numbered block while channel number two encrypts every 
even numbered block) with separate keys and IV’s (with inherent key management 
problem) can solve this. 
◊ Self-synchronizing 
Self-synchronizing stream ciphers takes key and previous “n” bits of cipher-text as 
input and generates key stream for next bit.  
There is no need to start decryption from the beginning of cipher-text; only “n” bits 
history of cipher-text is enough to resynchronize key stream generator. This trait can 
also be security vulnerability. If a portion of previously captured cipher-text is 
replayed, synchronization will break; however, it will take only “n” bits of damaged 
decryption until resynchronization. If receiving end is not using any sort of integrity 
checking mechanism (like message authentication codes -MAC), damaged n bits 
cannot be detected and a replay-attack might be possible. Bit losses from or 
insertions to cipher-text will break alignment of decryption and will cause damaged 
decryption there after.  
5.5.3.2. Block Ciphers 
Block ciphers encrypt blocks of plain text by transforming each block with a 
mathematical function. Basic operation is as follows: 
 
Figure 5.7: Block Cipher Operation 
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5.5.4. Encryption Modes 
Algorithms define how to encrypt plain text data so that the content is kept secret. 
However, an eavesdropper can still infer useful information by just listening ongoing 
traffic like if there are any patterns (parts of cipher-text repeating itself) or there are 
any fixed header or trailers; he does not need to decrypt cipher-text to get this info. 
Besides, an eavesdropper may want to inject previously captured cipher-text data to 
replay transactions; plain usage of algorithm may not prevent this. 
Encryption modes are customized usage of algorithms. It usually involves combining 
algorithms with some feedback or chain mechanism to gain security traits, which the 
algorithm cannot present naturally on its own. Usage of modes is a trade-off; they 
generally decrease encryption speed at varying levels, add complexity to code and 
effect fault tolerance. In this section, different modes are examined. Although effect 
to execution time is rarely a concern from security point of view, performance 
characteristics of different modes are given since it can affect usability of certain 
modes altogether. 
5.5.4.1. Electronic Code Book Mode 
Exactly one block of plain text is encrypted into exactly one block of cipher-text. It is 
even possible to consider each block as a message of its own. Encryption algorithm 
is illustrated below. Decryption is reverse flow of this process. 
 
Figure 5.8: Reference model for ECB mode encryption 
 
There is no relation between data blocks, this makes adding, removing, reordering 
and replaying of cipher-text blocks possible. Messages should be protected with 
message authentication code (MAC) algorithms, otherwise attackers can make harm 
without possession of key or knowledge of plain text. 
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Independence of blocks prevents error extension to other blocks in case of bit flips. 
Bit loses from or additions to cipher-text brakes synchronization in the block 
boundaries and results in defective decryption. 
Since all blocks are independent from each other, blocks can be encrypted or 
decrypted in parallel. Random access to different parts of data is possible without 
additional decryption. There are no additional operations; encryption and decryption 
are as fast as underlying algorithm is. 
5.5.4.2. Cipher Block Chaining Mode (CBC) 
This mode uses previous cipher-texts as feedback to encryption to eliminate block 
independency. Each block of plain text is XOR’ed with cipher-text of previous 
block, and encrypted into a cipher-text block. Encryption algorithm is illustrated 
below. Decryption is the reverse of this process. 
 
Figure 5.9: Reference model for CBC mode encryption 
 
Each block is dependent to previous block, if previous block is different, same plain 
text block will result in different cipher-text blocks because each plain text is 
XOR’ed with different data. Follow of this dependency chain brings to conclusion 
that if first block is different, then all subsequent cipher-text will be different even if 
the plain text is same. Initialization vectors (IV) are used as initial feedback value to 
give uniqueness to first block. Random data as first block distinguishes cipher-texts 
of plain text. IV’s does not need to be secret, after all each cipher-text used as 
feedback is an IV for later blocks. However, it must be unique and random. 
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Bit flips will result damage in its block and one block after it; two-block total will be 
damaged unrecoverable. Later block will still be good for decryption. Bit loses from 
or additions to cipher-text break synchronization of block boundaries and results in 
defective decryption. 
Parallel processing is not possible since blocks are dependent to each other. 
However, using different channels (for example channel 1 encrypts every odd 
numbered block while channel to encrypts every even numbered block) with separate 
keys and IV’s (with inherent key management problem) can solve this. Random 
access is not possible, either. To prevent starting from the beginning each time to 
decrypt data from random blocks, interim plain texts can be cached and that position 
can be used to start decryption instead. Caching plain-text data, however, is very 
hard to accomplish securely and can lead severe vulnerabilities. Additional problem 
is that extra XOR operations add performance overhead to process. 
5.5.4.3. Cipher Feedback Mode (CFM) 
Unlike block ciphers’ fixed size (rather large blocks), CFM allows custom sized 
blocks to be encrypted with any block cipher. Operation is very similar to CBC; 
varying block size brings additional complexity, though. 
 
Figure 5.10: Reference model for CFM mode encryption 
 
Like CBC mode, usage of IV is required to ensure similar plain-text messages to be 
rendered into different and seemingly unrelated cipher-text messages. As will be 
described shortly, if attacker can flip bits in cipher-text, it will result in one partially 
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damaged custom sized plain text ($100 might turn into $228 with flip of bit 8) and 
“b/s” completely damaged custom sized plain texts. If application does not (or 
cannot) check for completely damaged plain text, it must use MAC to prevent 
tampering with integrity of packets. 
Bit flips damage bits of plain text that are in the same positions and plain text will be 
partially damaged. After then, corrupt cipher-text will be fed back to key register and 
it will cause completely damaged plain-text results until it is shifted out from the 
register, which takes “b/s” steps. Bit loses from or additions to cipher-text break 
synchronization of block boundaries and results in defective decryption. 
Performance characteristics are similar to CBC mode. This mode has an additional 
benefit: Custom sized blocks can enable sending shorter network packets without the 
need of padding to the correct block size, which can be as much as 16 bytes. 
This mode is an example of self-synchronizing stream cipher; only things needed to 
synchronize are “b/s” custom sized cipher-text blocks. It has traits of self-
synchronizing stream ciphers mentioned earlier. 
5.5.4.4. Output-Feedback Mode (OFM) 
This mode is very similar to CFM, only difference is that key stream bits are directly 
used as feedback to feedback-chain.  
 
Figure 5.11: Reference model for OFM mode encryption 
 
This mode has similar characteristics like CFM. One advantage, however, is that 
there is no error extension. This can be also disadvantage: Bit flips will have impact 
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only on corresponding bit. In the absence of integrity checking, an attacker can 
toggle bits and modify plain text without knowing it. Bit loses from or additions to 
cipher-text brakes synchronization of block boundaries and results in defective 
decryption. 
This mode is an example of synchronous stream cipher. Synchronization for the “nth” 
bit needs generating “n-1” bits of key stream data. It has traits of synchronous stream 
ciphers mentioned earlier. 
5.5.4.5. Traffic Analysis 
Analysis of encrypted traffic is called Traffic Analysis and it aims to gather as much 
information as possible by analyzing encrypted traffic without any knowledge of 
plain-text data. This analysis can reveal message source, destination, length, time, 
frequency and match of this information with real life events like visits, meetings, 
working hours etc. Designers should decide whether analysis of their traffic is 
sensitive or not. Although lower layers of OSI can provide link-to-link encryption, 
(thus robustness against traffic analysis) higher levels usually provide only end-to-
end encryption (thus leaking routing –L3 and transport –L4 information).  
Choosing correct encryption mode with correct key management solves this problem. 
ECB mode is vulnerable to traffic analysis. CBC mode is secure against it. CFM and 
OFM modes are secure against traffic analysis, but reuse of key stream must be 
avoided. 
5.5.4.6. Conclusion 
Although different modes solve different problems, they all solve message secrecy 
related problems. Integrity and authentication must be provided by other means like 
MAC or digital signatures. 
5.5.5. Paging of Memory to Disk  
Although the application uses only dynamic memory and does not store any sensitive 
data in disk, virtual memory manager can decide to page out any data in memory, 
possibly including sensitive data. Long after the program exit, the data can reside in 
disk without any encryption. Thus, developers should use non-page able memory for 
sensitive information if analysis of disk by attackers is possible.  
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Allocating physical pages is possible in Windows Platform. 
AllocateUserPhysicalPages API call allocate requested amount of physical pages 
(not necessarily contiguous) which can be mapped to (contiguous) virtual addresses 
with MapUserPhysicalPages.  
There are two problems with these functions: first, they allocate physical memory 
and remove that memory from use of virtual memory manager. Excessive direct use 
of physical memory will make system low on memory. The other problem is that 
“AllocateUserPhysicalPages” requires SE_LOCK_MEMORY_NAME privilege in 
the token, which is not default. Administrators must grant this privilege to the user of 
application from Local Security Policy console and developers must adjust process 
token to be able to successfully call “AllocateUserPhysicalPages”. 
A very good functional level example can be seen at [33]. 
5.6. Binary Design and Least Privileged Users (LUA) 
5.6.1. Motivation 
Programs run in user accounts in order to be authenticated, authorized and accounted 
for their actions. Assume that a program is running in a certain user context, every 
action in that program will have same user access rights, and so will the worms and 
remotely injected malicious code. Usually, not whole application necessarily requires 
all access privileges that some special parts may require. Modularizing programs into 
parts of their required user privileges and giving those parts “just enough” access 
rights will protect computers in case of faulty behavior and/or malicious activity. 
This practice is called running programs in “Least Privileged User” account.  
One important thing to notice is that the use of “least privilege” does not necessarily 
mean really using least privileged user account in that system. It means that the user 
account that the program is running in has only minimum level of privileges that 
allows its execution, all other access rights are voluntarily given away. 
There are several methods to enable LUA [15]. Although COM is widely used on 
MS Windows based applications, its use as a mechanism to enable LUA was not 
documented before. Extending capabilities of such a widely used technology is main 
motivation of this section. 
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5.6.2. Previous Work 
[17] gives tremendous amount of information about DLLs in MS Windows and their 
OS level implementation. [34] gives information about creating DLLs and using 
them in applications. [35] and [36] gives information about how to enable COM 
authentication and authorization, which is required knowledge to implement ideas of 
this thesis. Unfortunately, COM is an old technology and its existence is well before 
security awareness. At the time that COM emerges, there have been some articles 
about its efficient usage. Later on, interest in COM (and other similar technologies 
like CORBA) is decreased with the introduction of later and advanced technologies. 
This hampered research on COM technology. Therefore, even after security pushes, 
researches did not go back and look at COM. Even security articles about LUA 
presented other approaches that had different advantages. However, author of this 
thesis decided to work on this technology because of the reasons mentioned on 
motivation section.  
5.6.3. Background Information: DLLs 
Dynamic Link Libraries have many advantages over static ones. First, as its name 
implies, it is possible to select desired library at the runtime. For example, different 
strategies with same interfaces can be distributed to different DLL’s. At the runtime, 
executable can read an initialization file (or query registry in Microsoft Windows) 
and load desired library. Another advantage is that some DLL’s do not get loaded 
until there is an explicit request to functionality in it. Those DLL’s are called delay 
loaded DLL’s and most of the DLL’s can be specified as delay loadable during 
compile time of the library. Yet another good side with DLL’s is that they are shared 
among different processes on the same machine. Unlike statically linked libraries, 
same instance of DLL is shared. For example, C runtime library is so widely used; 
statically linked programs will carry and load their copy of the library, thus wasting 
space and reducing likelihood of successful cache hits. Shared CRT could save space 
and since only one copy would reside in the memory, there is much less chance that 
it is swapped out.  
In the security perspective, DLL’s present some interesting traits: since DLL’s help 
projects to be divided into smaller independent binary modules, it is possible to 
update modules individually. Assume that new security vulnerability is found in the 
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300 MB application. Users would have a very bad time to patch it from the Internet if 
the application is monolithic; users would have to download the whole 300 MB of 
data. This is very discouraging; users will try to combine downloads among different 
security updates, while in the meantime their systems will be left vulnerable. With 
DLL’s in the scheme, it is possible to update DLL’s that needs fix, which will be 
only a few hundred KB’s usually. 
However, on the downside, there are points to be aware while using DLL’s. Since 
they are separate from executable binary, executable has no control on their 
authenticity. A malicious DLL presenting same interface can be named exactly as the 
old one and be replaced with it. Executable then will load this DLL, without knowing 
it is malicious. Operating system will run a digitally signed executable without user 
confirmation, however digital signatures are limited to executables. Executable will 
load malicious DLL and most probably will do things that are not intended at all. 
This problem can be resolved with DLL checksums and hashes.  
5.6.4. Background Information: Privileges and Access Rights 
Access rights are the rights that allow or deny selected set of users from performing 
certain operations. An operating system object can have an access control list, which 
defines who is allowed to do what and who is denied from doing what. This is 
similar in firewall or router access lists. Access rights are applied to single objects. 
Although objects (most notably file system entities) can inherit ACL’s from their 
parents, this should not confuse the readers, objects still have their private ACL, only 
thing is setting ACL’s on multiple files is done easier that way. For instance, file 
deletion, mutual exclusion object releasing, process terminations are all access right 
checked operations. 
Privileges are global access rights and they do not apply to objects. For example, 
taking ownership of objects, kernel debugging, running in system context, allocating 
physical pages are special privileges that are granted on user bases. Some users have 
only a few of those privileges, more powerful ones (notably administrators or roots) 
have most or all of them. Since privileges have broader applicability, they are 
generally more powerful. For instance, a user account having the privilege of taking 
ownership of objects can read or write any object in that system, even if there is no 
specific ACL that grants performed operation. 
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5.6.5. COM Encapsulation 
Component Object Model can be seen as advanced version of DLL’s. They present 
same advantages and add other ones at their own. “DLL Hell” is not anymore an 
issue with COM; it has its own versioning scheme.  
The interesting thing with COM from security perspective is that they can be loaded 
in process or out-of-process. If a COM binary is in process, it is pretty much the 
same as DLL’s. Function calls will be handled in the same address space and 
privilege level as the host process. If a (for example “parser”) function is 
compromised, then whole executable is compromised. Attacker will have exact 
security rights as the process, and every action the attacker takes will be accounted to 
the principle that created the process.  
 
Figure 5.12: Address space with regular DLL usage. 
 
Out-of-process servers, on the other hand, will have their own memory space and 
security context along with privileges. Since there is no direct address space mapping 
among executable and COM module, RPC mechanism is used to get them 
communicated properly. Every call will be marshaled and send via some transport 
protocol to the server. Replies from the server will be returned similarly. Please see 
below: 
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Figure 5.13: Address space with COM usage. 
 
On the picture, “Crypto.DLL” represent an in-process COM server, thus it is loaded 
into the same address space as executable itself. “Parser.Exe” is a out-process COM 
module with some DLL dependencies of its own, thus it loaded into different address 
space with its DLL’s. Similarly, “NetworkListener.Exe” is another out-process COM 
module and it is loaded into another address space with its dependencies. Address 
space of executable does not have direct access to other spaces; it must use some 
inter process communication (IPC) mechanism. COM uses RPC as IPC. Each call to 
these different spaces is first marshaled, and then transferred with some transport 
protocol (LPC, TCP, UDP, etc.).  
Beauty of this scheme is that different address spaces can have different security 
settings and privileges. If, for instance, “NetworkListener.Exe” process is 
compromised, attacker will be able to use only its access rights. In a security 
conscious system, this process would have almost no rights, which makes a 
successful attack almost useless.  
Since RPC can use different transport protocols that are transparent to COM, 
different process spaces can reside in different physical machines. This is called 
Distributed COM, DCOM. This tremendous amount of flexibility allows 
architectures as below: 
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Figure 5.14: Sample architecture with out-of-process COM usage 
 
“Figure 5.14: Sample architecture with out-of-process COM usage” presents a 
sample architecture, where computers of different roles reside in different and access 
controlled network segments. 
5.6.6. COM+ 
COM+ COM with some advanced transaction services. These services make role 
based security and transaction management very easy and robust. DCOM developers 
should gain information about COM+, use integrated features rather than developing 
their custom code, and spend time on testing, improving, and hardening. 
5.7. Threat Modeling 
Threat modeling is required to understand and assess possible threats to the software. 
A good and sound design can be established only after such an analysis. Moreover, 
analysis of threats allows people at different position to understand possible threats 
and mitigations for these threats.  
Since previous work is satisfying, this thesis will not detail threat modeling anymore. 
Especially [46] is one of the best general-purpose books about this subject.  
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6. Implementation 
In this chapter, possible new improvements will be covered in the order of 
applicability: from one line to the whole program. All the examples are compiled and 
verified with Windows XP SP2 Build 2600.2158 and with Microsoft (R) 32-bit 
C/C++ Standard Compiler Version 13.10.3077 for 80x86.  
6.1. One Line Code Mistakes Catalog 
6.1.1. Motivation 
Software, obviously, consists of source code, which consists of lines. Theoretically, 
every code defect has a possibility to turn into security vulnerability. Having a 
catalog of example errors will increase developer awareness of possible caveats. 
Code defects are not necessarily inevitable; there are some methods to at least reduce 
the number of defects. This section aims providing those methods along with defects 
to help developers during implementation. 
Main motivation of this section is showing that it is possible to reduce the number of 
defects by identifying them and providing countermeasures. 
An objection can be that it is impossible to enumerate all of the defects those are one 
line. We agree with that criticism. However, it is possible to catalog families of code 
defects. There will be always some defects that are not mentioned in this thesis 
exactly; nevertheless, they will closely resemble the examples of this catalog and will 
be coming from same family. 
Another objection can be that examples in this section are generally caused by 
careless developer; a good developer with high concentration would never make such 
mistakes and this section is therefore useless. We do not agree with this criticism. 
First, there will always be times that developers are not at their highest level of 
concentration. This can be caused by long working hours, stress of approaching 
deadlines, and magnitude of source code base, bad working environment and bad 
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tools. This thesis can help by spotting highest risk portions of code. Furthermore, this 
section can be used as code review checklist. Second, this section not only 
enumerates code defects, but also teaches countermeasures to prevent them from 
happening. 
Yet another objection can be that examples of this section are not novel; one way or 
another, each example is still in some live code in some application. We agree with 
this criticism, most of the code defects in this section are not novel and they are not 
created specifically for this thesis. However, writing down code defects that is not 
occurred anywhere before is not a goal for this section, anyway. The goal of this 
section is cataloging and presenting of previously done code defects in order to show 
that they were evitable and they can be prevented in the future. 
6.1.2. Previous Work 
[16] is a great book on writing better code generally. Readers following the 
recommendation will benefit most likely. However, this work lacks of concentration 
of one-line code defects. There are numerous samples, but they are scattered 
throughout the book, reader has to read the book completely to access this 
information. Moreover, this thesis covers more code defects that are covered in that 
book. An older book, [37], gives an insight into C code defects. Nevertheless, the 
defects mentioned in that book are generally functional level defects, like not 
checking for NULL values or not using memory allocations correctly. [38] and [39] 
gives information about how to improve C++ usage. That book has one-line code 
improvements, which are actually very useful. However, they are improvements, not 
the defects. This thesis has another approach than that book.  
6.1.3. Introduction 
Every program consists of source codes, which ultimately consists of source lines. 
Any change to coding practices will improve source code quality dramatically. 
Applicability and severity are provided to make extended usage of this thesis as a 
reference possible. Severity levels are enumerated as “Low,” “Medium” and “High.”  
• Low: Only minor consequences are expected 
• Medium: Attacker can use this as a leverage to a more severe attack. 
53 
• High: Attacker can inject code, escalate privileges, and execute remote code. 
Applicability is categorized as “Limited” and “Broad.” 
• Limited: Easy to find and fix. Introduced by  
o Only by lest frequently used features of programming languages, or, 
o Really distracted programmer, or, 
o Bad programming practices. 
• Broad: Hard to find but easy to fix defects. Introduced by 
o Frequently used features of programming languages, 
o Minor distraction of programmer, even during following good 
programming practices. 
Each title will have “(Sev: ###, App: ###)” decoration. 
6.1.4. Integer Overflows (Sev: High, App: Broad) 
6.1.4.1. Concept 
All integral data types of C are kept in fixed finite size storage in memory or 
registers of CPU. For instance, integers can be defined to be 8, 16, 32, 64 or 128 bits 
wide and this storage cannot grow automatically; thus, maximum values of integral 
data types are predefined.  
The problem with C is that if programmer tries to store a value with larger storage 
space requirements than current variable can provide, C assumes that this is intended 
by the programmer and silently trims overflowed part and fits remaining smaller 
value into existing storage. This happens without generating any kind of exception or 
error. Silently suppressing errors or converting variables implicitly mean bad 
practices of a language. Integers are of particular interest because they are generally 
used as counters or to hold lengths of buffers. Silently overflowing and presenting 
wrong length of an existing buffer or required length of a buffer results in security 
vulnerabilities caused by buffer overflows. 
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6.1.4.2. Background Information: Machine Representation 
This paragraph describes machine representation of integers. Computers store 
integers in binary base-two format. An 8-bit integer means that computer will use 
eight binary digits to represent this particular integer value. Integer can be signed, or 
unsigned. Unsigned integers can only represent zero or positive values where signed 
integers can represent negative values below zero, too. Unsigned integers utilize 
every binary digit to represent the value. For example, 8-bit wide unsigned integer 
can range from (00000000)2 to (11111111)2 which equals from 0 to 255. Signed 
integers use most significant bit of storage as sign indicator, cleared bit (0) means 
value is positive and set bit (1) means value is negative. Negative values are stored 
by first subtracting one and then in 2’s complement form. Below can be found 
sample values and their machine representation in 8 bits wide signed integer on IA32 
platform. 
Table 6.1: Signed and unsigned integers in binary form 
Decimal 
Value Conversion Operation Machine Representation 
128 & over N/A N/A 
127 127 to binary form (0111 1111), add sign (0111 1111) (0)111 1111 
10 10 to binary form (0000 1010), add sign (0000 1010) (0)000 1010 
1 1 to binary form (0000 0001), add sign (0000 0001) (0)000 0001 
0 0 to binary form (0000 0000), add sign (0000 0000) (0)000 0000 
-1 1 to binary form (000 0001), subtract 1 (000 0000), flip bits (111 1111), add sign (1 111 1111) (1)111 1111 
-10 10 to binary form (000 1010), subtract 1 (000 1001), flip bits (111 0110), add sign (1111 0110) (1)111 0110 
-128 128 to binary form (1000 0000) subtract 1 (111 1111), flip bits (000 0000), add sign (1000 0000) (1)000 0000 
-129 & below N/A N/A 
 
Please consider following code snippet: 
117 unsigned short int iVar; 
118 iVar = 0; 
119   
120 while (1) {   //Infinite loop 
121  ++ iVar; } //Increment i continuosly.. 
Figure 6.2: Sample integer-overflowing code 
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Variable “iVar” is defined as “unsigned short int” which is 16 bits wide in IA32 
platform. After initializing to zero, program continuously increments its value. 
“iVar” is represented with 16 binary digits, its maximum value can be (1111 1111 
1111 1111)2, which is 65535 decimal. Next incrementation will result in 65536, or (1 
0000 0000 0000 0000) which is 17 bits long and cannot be accommodated on 16 bits. 
What happens is that most significant bits those cannot fit into 16 bits space get 
chopped off and remaining result is stored in “iVar”. For this case, (1 0000 0000 
0000 0000) will be trimmed to (0000 0000 0000 0000), or (0) decimal. Program will 
continue looping from 0 to 65535, then wrap to 0 and do the same again.  
As a summary,  
 N-bit wide unsigned integer can have values from (0) to (2n-1) 
 N-bit wide signed integer can have values from (-2n-1) to (2n-1-1) 
6.1.4.3. Summary of Previous Work 
[16] does a great job proposing a class that handles integer operations. Author 
strongly suggests use of that class for any general-purpose integer handling that is 
developed in C++. However, there are substantial amount of C code, too, and this 
paper falls short to address this issue. 
[19] and [30] propose a preprocessor application that injects overflow and underflow 
detection code to the source code. This is fine for retrofitting old code base; however, 
with a few drawbacks of its own. First, injecting code to the finished product and just 
passing to the compiler requires great confidence in the correctness of preprocessor 
application. Second, they increase execution time because of added code. Proposition 
of [16] also increases execution time, but it is more controlled. After all, developer 
can decide where to use the SafeInt class, with contrast to automatic tools, which just 
inject code to check all integer operations. 
Compilers usually have command line options to detect assignments to smaller data 
types. This feature can be used both in debug and release builds. They have also 
added disadvantage of added code; however, compiler added code is generally much 
faster and its impact is negligible. As an example, this functionality is provided in 
MS Visual Studio with “Runtime Checks” option.  
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There are static code analyzing tools which analyze ready to compile data and 
generate a report. Those tools are great to increase confidence in the product; 
however, they cannot be used to guarantee defect free code. They do their best to 
detect most common scenarios. On the other hand, nested cases can be impossible to 
detect with those tools. PreFast [41] is a publicly available tool from Research 
Department of Microsoft Corporation. Advantage of this tool is that it detects other 
types of code defects as well. However, it is hard to say that this tool is very good at 
integer overflow detection.  Another tool is lint; unfortunately, this tool is showing 
its age and therefore not competent on finding integer overflow bugs. 
6.1.4.4. In new [] Operator 
C++ new operator has integer overflow possibility, which occurs during calculation 
of allocation size. The fact that new operator is universal makes this vulnerability 
even more concerning. Below is a sample call to operator new and related 
disassembly of binary code. This code is generated with Microsoft (R) 32-bit C/C++ 
Standard Compiler Version 13.10.3077 for 80x86. Intel(R) C++ Compiler 8.1 
generates similar code.  
122 int *ptr = new int [rand()]; 
123  call  @ILT+825(_rand) (41133Eh) 
124  shl   eax,2  ;This is where integer overflow can 
happen. 
125  push  eax   
126  call  operator new (41146Fh) 
Figure 6.3: Integer overflow in C++ new operator 
 
The danger here is the false sense of who assumes responsibility. Developers take 
responsibility when they are using “malloc()” and calculating allocation size 
manually. However, it is reasonable to expect that compiler will do the math in a safe 
way when using language features, which is not the case always. 
6.1.4.5. Underflows 
Integers can underflow, too. This is especially common in loops. For example, if 
value of “1” is subtracted from an unsigned integer with value of 0, it will wrap to its 
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maximum value. Underflows mainly caused during string operations (subtracting 
terminating NUL character from a string length that is already zero) and backwards 
loop processing. Following code is always defective: 
127 unsigned int cur; 
128  
129 for (cur = SOME_MAX_VALUE; cur >= 0; --cur) { 
130  ... } 
Figure 6.4: Integer under flowing sample code 
 
Value of loop variable will always be larger than zero, it is an unsigned type. 
Variable will wrap to 0xFFFFFFFF, which is a large number, probably larger than 
the array it is indexing. If developer is lucky enough, there will be an access violation 
and the program will die. Otherwise, it will execute silently without getting notices 
and possibly cause a buffer overrun. 
6.1.4.6. Conclusion 
Integer overflows can happen silently and cause severe security vulnerabilities. 
Developers should pay special attention while writing code to do mixed mode 
(signed – unsigned) arithmetic or dealing with rather large values with respect to 
possible maximum number that the specific integer variable can hold. Best approach, 
however, would be using template based integer class that makes overflow detection 
autonomously. Higher-level languages like Visual Basic or C# is therefore very 
beneficial. 
6.1.5. Decision Statements  
6.1.5.1. Parentheses (Sev: High, App: Broad) 
Always use parentheses in decision statements. Programming languages are very 
complex in their nature and not every programmer may know every little detail. 
Using language in the way it makes sense will not work always, there are some 
issues which their existence in language specification is only because of backwards 
compatibility and coherence with some (then -like 20 years ago) existing software. C 
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language is in particular vulnerable to this problem because of being an old language; 
its root goes before establishment of strong theory of computer languages. 
6.1.5.2. A Warning for Comparison Operators (Sev: Med, App: Broad) 
A programmer should search for all assignment operators (“=”) before each 
milestone. Below is seen two very simple yet hard to discover errors: 
131 if (iRequested = iReceived) .. 
132 if (iRequested =! iReceived) .. 
Figure 6.5: Sample comparison operator typos 
 
Line 131 displays an example of typo of comparison operator. Line 132 displays an 
example of typo in negative comparison (inequality) operator. Simple typing errors 
like this can jeopardize security of whole project especially in not-so-often-executed 
error handling codes, which makes detection hard. When a corner case happens and 
this error handling code is expected to run, it will not (or it will, whichever is worse 
according to Moore’s laws). 
One solution to this could be not putting possible left-values (l-value) to the left of 
comparison. Please consider following code fragment: 
133 if (iErrorCount = 0) 
134  ... 
135 if (0 = iErrorCount) 
136  ... 
Figure 6.6: Swapping places of compared variables 
 
Where line 133 will (incorrectly) evaluate to false all the time, line 135 will give a 
compile time error. As it is repeated frequently in this thesis, a quality conscious 
programmer always should favor compile time errors and warnings over runtime 
failures. This is being on the safe side, which is inherent security. 
6.1.6. Memory Barriers (Sev: High, App: Low) 
Compilers are allowed to optimize code with best of their knowledge of the source 
code. For instance, please consider following fragment of code: 
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137 Int I; 
138   
139 I = 4; 
140 I = 5; 
141 I = 6; 
Figure 6.7: Memory Barrier Example Part 1 
 
A straightforward code generation could be as follows (in pseudo assembly) 
142 Read I to Register1 
143 Modify Register1 with 4 
144 Store Register1 to I 
145 Read I to Register1 
146 Modify Register1 with 5 
147 Store Register1 to I 
148 Read I to Register1 
149 Modify Register1 with 6 
150 Store Register1 to I 
Figure 6.8: Memory Barrier Example Part 2 
 
Although simple, this code is not as efficient it could be. Please consider following 
fragment: 
151 Read I to Register1 
152 Modify Register1 with 4 
153 Modify Register1 with 5 
154 Modify Register1 with 6 
155 Store Register1 to I 
Figure 6.9: Memory Barrier Example Part 3 
 
Compiler optimizes code by removing redundant reads and stores. It can further 
improve code as follows: 
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156 Read I to Register1 
157 Modify Register1 with 6 
158 Store Register1 to I 
Figure 6.10: Memory Barrier Example Part 4 
 
Compilers may optimize the code in a way that skips operation in the source code. 
This is usually not a problem, since it is not visible to the caller. However, there can 
be cases, where this is problematic. For instance, program could really want to read, 
modify and store to this memory address because it is performing a memory mapped 
IO. To ensure correct operation, programmer must use memory barriers. A memory 
barrier is a statement, which tells the compiler that contents of memory cannot be 
cached (It can be changed OOB –by other threads. Alternatively, it must be stored 
back with most current data because other threads that compiler is not aware of them 
may depend on it). C and C++ have “volatile” keyword for this purpose.  
Alternatively, #pragma (optimize) keyword can be used to disable all optimizations 
locally. 
6.1.7. Not Zeroing Unused Out Parameters (Sev: Low App: High) 
C and C++ have inconsistent ways of error reporting. Setting last error, returning 
zero, returning negative values, returning positive values and throwing exceptions 
are only some of the varieties. Users may get confused with all of these possibilities 
and forget to check success status. Even worse, programmer can think that he or she 
is checking return value, although he or she may be checking incorrectly.  
Leaving out parameters untouched in an error case can be dangerous if a caller fails 
checking the success status. Parameters will have some random garbage data causing 
the program to fail somewhere in the execution process. Microsoft API’s do the 
zeroing right in the beginning of code; this has advantage of checking write access to 
out parameters in the beginning of code. Although costly, it can help developing 
code that is more robust. 
6.1.8. Call Conventions (Sev: High App: Low) 
Order of parameters while passing to functions and responsibility assignment of 
stack pushes / pops are called calling conventions. Most popular ones are “stdcall”, 
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“cdecl”, and “fastcall”. Writing code that depends on certain calling convention 
decreases portability of code and can cause security vulnerabilities. 
Please consider following code fragment: 
159 int sub(int i, int j) { 
160     return i-j; } 
161   
162 int number = 3; 
163 sub(++number, number) 
Figure 6.11: Example Case Where Call Conventions Make Difference 
 
Result of function call is undetermined, because it can be either 4-4=0 (parameters 
are passed from left to right) or 4-3=1 (parameters are passed from right to left).  
Programmer can explicitly define calling convention by declaring it right after 
function name as follows: 
164 int __cdecl sub(int I, int J) { 
165     return I - J; } 
Figure 6.12: Example Code of Clarification of Calling Convention 
 
However, this style of coding is not recommended either because of its complexity. 
Callers should not assume any calling convention and should not modify input 
variables multiple times while passing to functions. 
6.1.9. Improper Size Declarations (Sev: High App: Low) 
Please consider following code fragment: 
166 ZeroMemory(pDecoded, sizeof(HEADER)); 
Figure 6.13: Example for Bad Size Declaration 
 
Nobody can verify the correctness of this piece of code, because it is not possible to 
tell that “pDecoded” is really pointing to an instance of “HEADER”. If the 
programmer changes the type of variable that is being set, then he also has to traverse 
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whole code base and change size declarations. This is error prone and cumbersome. 
Better method is: 
167 ZeroMemory(pDecoded, sizeof(*pDecoded)); 
Figure 6.14: Example for Better Size Declaration 
 
This approach is good only for pointers of base types. Inherited pointers size would 
be smaller than what is actually required. Because of its obscure nature, this kind of 
code defect can be hard to discover, too. 
This approach will not work with array pointer in function pointers. Please consider 
following code fragment: 
168 void MyFunc(char szString[32]) { 
169     ZeroMemory(szString, sizeof(szString)); } 
Figure 6.15: Caveat in Function Declarations 
 
Here, “sizeof(szString)” will be evaluated whatever the size of pointer in that system 
is, not to the expected 32. This is because “szString” is just a pointer. Array 
declaration makes it very confusing, but this type of declaration is needed for type 
safety. “szString” is a pointer to a place in memory that can hold 32 character 
variables. In practice, compiler does not care if “szString” is defined to be 32 
elements, 4 elements, or empty brackets. 
6.1.10. String Constants 
6.1.10.1. Automatic String Concatenations (Sev: High, App: Broad) 
Strings are concatenated invisibly if two string constants are next to each other. 
170 printf(“Som” “e” 
171  “ sentence.”); 
Figure 6.16: Automatic string concatenation 
Some sentence. 
Figure 6.17: Result of automatic string concatenation 
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Although this is useful for aligning and making code pretty, its misuse can lead to 
memory access violations. 
172 printf(“Error message is %s\n   Details are %s and \n%s” 
173  “Network Failure”, 
174  “Corrupt network package is received” //Comma missing! 
175  “This can be due to bad cabling on the network.”); 
Figure 6.18: String concatenation error 
 
In line 174, comma is missing, this causes behind the scenes concatenation of string 
in line 174 and line 175. “printf” is supplied with two string pointers only, although it 
is expecting three of them. The result on Windows XP SP2 Build 2600.2158 and 
with Microsoft (R) 32-bit C/C++ Standard Compiler Version 13.10.3077 for 80x86 
is 
Error message is Corrupt network package is receivedThis can be due to 
bad cabling on the network. 
   Details are n and 
ï≡à÷☼ì═É☺Network Failure 
Figure 6.19: Result of string concatenation error 
 
This surely is not what was expected. The scrambled portion of text is what is on the 
stack at that time. Imagine for a second that this text message was sent over the 
network as error reporting mechanism of some sort of server application (web server, 
application server, etc.). The stack info on the message will be a good advantage for 
an attacker, which can now infer memory position of this function. 
The only proactive solution to this problem can be usage of static code analyzers like 
“lint”, “PreFast” and “prefix” or searching through project files for quotation (“) 
marks and inspecting source code. Either way, this will be long task and may be 
performed only milestone basis. 
6.1.10.2. Escape Characters (Sev: Low, App: Broad) 
To begin with, some background information is presented here: Escape character 
handling is done at C preprocessor level, not compiler level. This means that if 
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unknown escape sequences are passed to functions, preprocessor will handle those 
and compiler will be unaware of those and will not generate error.  
Preprocessors usually warn about unknown escape characters, a good developer 
should take those warning account. However, they do not warn against unwanted but 
legal escape sequences. Please consider following code fragment: 
176 char a[] = “Result of a/b is”; 
177 char b[] = “Result of a\b is”; 
Figure 6.20: Unintended escape sequence in strings 
 
Size of array “a” is 17, while size of array “b” is 16. Programmer thought that using 
‘\’ is more artistic, however ‘\b’ is escape sequence for backspace character and 
output for array “b” will be (incorrectly) 
Result of  is 
Figure 6.21: Result of sample unintended escapes sequence 
 
Besides erroneous message to the end user, there can be security vulnerability here. 
Assume that there are some unintended escaped characters. Programmer counts 
characters with hand (Very bad programming practice) and sends message over the 
wire with calculated length. This “length” information however will be incorrect 
because what appears as two characters becomes suddenly one character during 
preprocessing. Sender procedure, which is instructed to send “x” bytes but supplied 
only “<x” bytes will send the message, and send whatever is on the stack after that 
message as well. 
6.1.10.3. Avoid String Constants 
As a general rule, string constants should not be embedded into the source code, at 
least they should be avoided as much as possible.  
First, software localization staff will have to modify source code itself during 
localization; modifying checked in source code is not desirable. This will make 
localization difficult, more time consuming and prone to introducing code defects.  
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Second, it will bloat the code and will make it harder to read. If there are many long 
string constants, this will be more significant. 
After all, separating resources and code are a very good programming practice. 
6.1.11. Octal Numbers (Sev: High, App: Limited) 
In C and C++, octal numbers (numbers in base 8) are denoted with 0 (zero) in the 
beginning. This is not such a good idea, because 0011 is now not 11, but 9. This can 
be dangerous if programmer uses “0” to align numbers in the source code. [50] 
6.1.12. “Struct” Keyword 
6.1.12.1. Bit Fields (Sev: Medium, App: Limited- Only Direct Memory 
Representation Usage) 
Bit fields are custom sized fields in structures. For example, it is possible to see a 
structure with bit fields below, possibly a C representation of a network protocol to 
communicate with the wire. 
178 struct MyStruct { 
179  unsigned  iMajVersion : 2; 
180  unsigned iMinVersion : 2; 
181  unsigned fUnEncrypted : 1; 
182  unsigned fKeepAlive : 1; 
183  .. }; 
Figure 6.22: Bit fields in C/C++ structures 
 
However, there is a caution for the users of bit field feature: which field is going to 
be most significant bit, which one is going to be least significant bit is architecture 
and compiler dependant. 
6.1.12.2. Member Alignment 
Detailed discussion about this subject can be found in section 8.4.1.2, where we are 
analyzing interesting compiler flags. 
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6.1.13. Switch Statements  
Switch statements saves the trouble of using bad looking “if” - “else if” - “else” 
statements. However, it has its own dangers. 
6.1.13.1. Auto Fall Through (Sev: Med, App: Limited) 
Switch statement has automatic fall through down to other “case” labels unless this 
behavior is broken with “brake.” This feature is rarely seen useful in real life and has 
been danger for software quality and security in that perspective. Please consider 
following example: 
184 int ReturnExpectedPacketLength(int iPacketType) { 
185  int iRes; 
186  
187  switch (iPacketType) { 
188  case PACK_TYPE_AUTHENTICATION:  
189   iRes = 5; 
190   break; 
191  case PACK_TYPE_ACCOUNTING: 
192   iRes = 7;  //break is forgotten 
193  default: 
194   iRes = -1; } 
195  
196  return iRes; } 
Figure 6.23: Forgotten break in switch statement 
 
Here, break directive after Line 192 is forgotten; this erroneously causes the function 
to return unexpected value. According to P. V. D. Linden [1994]:  
Default Fall through is Wrong 97% of the Time 
We analyzed the Sun C compiler sources to see how often the default fall through was used. 
The Sun ANSI C compiler front end has 244 switch statements, each of which has an average 
of seven cases. Fall through occurs in just 3% of all cases. 
This error is an example of “what is not there, although it should have been”. This 
kind of errors is hard to see if it is not known exactly what to look for. A good habit 
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before each milestone is string searching each instance of case labels and checking if 
any of the break statements is missing. 
6.1.13.2. Calculations in Case Labels (Sev: Low, App: Limited) 
It is not a good habit to construct switch cases with inline calculations like 
197 case 5 + enum.WeeksAYear: 
198  ... 
Figure 6.24: Calculation in case labels 
 
Although this turns out to be the same binary code as if direct result of calculation is 
used, it causes poor readability of source code. As mentioned in this thesis, poor 
readability makes maintenance more difficult, which causes to regressions 
somewhere along the lifetime of code. 
6.1.14. Macro Statements 
Although many people frequently discourage usage of macros, macros are so 
combined with existing code-base. This paragraph aims to help at least correct usage 
of them, when usage is unavoidable. 
6.1.14.1. Spaces in Macros (Sev: Med, App: Limited) 
One caveat with Macros is that spaces matter in macro statements unlike regular C 
code. For instance, please consider following two macros: 
199 #define MULTIPLY_BY_TWO_A(x) 2*x 
200 #define MULTIPLY_BY_TWO_B (x) 2*x 
Figure 6.25: Macro statement with parameters 
 
They are different. 
201 int i = MULTIPLY_BY_TWO_A(7);  //int i = 2*7 
202 int i = MULTIPLY_BY_TWO_B(7);  //int i = (x) 2*x 
Figure 6.26: Typo in macro statement 
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Although this kind of errors usually yields to compile time warnings or errors, there 
can be some statements, which are legal for C but unintended in runtime. 
6.1.14.2. Issues in Macro Calls (Sev: Med, App: Broad) 
Macro calls are different from function calls. While calling a function, arguments are 
evaluated to their final values and then they are passed to the function as parameters. 
However, during macro calls, arguments are passed in as-is basis. Please consider 
following program fragment: 
203 #define MULTIPLY_BY_TWO(ToMul) 2 * ToMul 
204   
205 int MultiplyByTwo(int iToMul) { 
206  return iToMul * 2; } 
207   
208 int SomeFunc() { 
209  int iRes1, iRes2; 
210  
211  iRes1 = MULTIPLY_BY_TWO(7+2); 
212  iRes2 = MultiplyByTwo(7+2); 
213   
214  printf(“iRes1 = %d, iRes2 = %d”, iRes1, iRes2); } 
Figure 6.27: Parenthesis usage in macro statements 
 
Output of this program will be (unexpectedly): 
iRes1 = 16, iRes2 = 18 
Figure 6.28: Sample result of bad parenthesis usage 
 
What happened here is operator precedence took over during direct substitution. 
215 iRes1 = MULTIPLY_BY_TWO(7+2); //iRes1 = 2 * 7+2; 
Figure 6.29: Operator precedence during macro substitution 
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Correct usage of macro should include parentheses as follows: 
216 #define MULTIPLY_BY_TWO(ToMul) (2 * (ToMul)) 
Figure 6.30: Correct usage of parenthesis in sample macro 
 
Please note that parentheses are inserted not just around macro parameters, but also 
around entire macro, too. 
6.1.14.3. Macros are Type Unsafe (Sev: Med, App: Limited) 
C and C++ compiler checks parameters for type safety when passing to functions. 
However, passing arguments is just substitution and occurs before compilation 
during preprocessing. This is a very bad situation, callers use libraries and they 
seldom refer to source code; what they have usually is only function or macro name. 
Please consider following (though practically useless) implementations of pointer 
iterators and how misleading the macro name is: 
217 #define ADVANCE_TO_NEXT_BYTE(x) ((x)+1) 
218   
219 BYTE * AdvanceToNextByte(BYTE * b) { 
220  return b+1; } 
Figure 6.31: Sample type-unsafe macro 
 
The macro version is obviously designed for pointers of type BYTE only. However, 
caller of this macro will not be warned in case of passing different type of pointer. 
Assume that caller passes a pointer to an instance of type WORD (two bytes); each 
iteration will be now two bytes, instead of intended single byte.  Function version 
(Line 219~220) of this implementation would warn and suggest type casting if it is 
really what was intended. This macro could be written with explicit type cast, but 
programmer probably did not think this (probably future) usage. This unexpected 
extension of usage scenarios are one of the most dominant causes of security 
vulnerabilities. 
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6.1.14.4. Summary 
We consider usage of macros generally unnecessary and they must be avoided if 
possible (and it should be possible almost all the time). Motivation to use macros 
includes their speed and flexibility on accepting arguments of different types. 
Functions can be inlined, too. This allows lightweight functions that are as fast as 
macros because they do not have stack operations. Although programmer can define 
explicitly with “inline” keyword, C / C++ compilers are good at detecting frequently 
used short functions and in lining them.  
The answer to the second argument (flexibility) is usage of template functions in 
C++. They are type-safe and provide almost same amount flexibility.  
The only correct usage of macros may be (though, arguably) in the case of 
unavoidable need to preprocessor string concatenations (“##” operator), where 
C/C++ language does not offer an alternative. 
6.1.15. Unexpected Compiler Optimizations 
What is written as high-level source code does not necessarily translate exactly to 
binary code; compiler optimizations can change order of operations, delete them or 
add new operations, unless “observed” behavior of source code does not change. For 
instance: 
221 int Function() { 
222  int i, j, k; 
223    
224  i = 2; 
225  j = 3; 
226  k = 6; // Å Does not have effect on the result! 
227   
228  return i * j; } 
Figure 6.32:  Sample code with optimized out code lines 
 
Observed behavior of this function is returning 2*3=6. Once compiler deduces this 
fact, it can 
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• Optimize out assignment 6 to k 
• Optimize out stack space allocated for k 
• Optimize out real assignments to “i” and “j” and use registers instead 
• Optimize out real multiplication and replace it with constant “6” 
• Optimize out function body, and replace entire function with constant “6” 
according its capabilities and configuration. 
Security related clean-up operations are especially prone to this optimizer side effect 
since some security calls are seemingly unnecessary. For example: 
229 void DecryptFile() { 
230  BYTE baKey[32]; 
231   
232  ... 
233  if (SUCCEEDED(GetUserKey(baKey, sizeof(baKey))) { 
234   ... 
235   ZeroMemory(baKey, sizeof(baKey)); }  
236  ... } 
Figure 6.33: Sample optimized out security code 
 
Here, developer gets user key, uses it and when it is required no more, wipes it out. 
Actual behavior is probably not as described in previous sentence. If optimizer 
deduces that source code assigns zeros to local array “baKey” and never uses these 
values until it goes out of scope with function return, it can decide that this is not 
necessary because it does not affect observed behavior. Developer should have used 
“SecureZeroMemory” [67] API call instead. 
6.1.16. Obscure C Syntax 
Stay away from uncommon and obscure syntax of C. Using uncommon practices will 
be confusing, thus error prone. 
6.1.16.1. Array Declaration 
In C, the following two lines are equal: 
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237 int iaVar[SIZE]; 
238 int SIZE[iaVar];  
Figure 6.34: Obfuscated C array declaration 
 
This is unnecessary syntactic redundancy. Current C compilers from Microsoft and 
Intel no longer allow such array declarations. 
6.1.16.2. Concatenated Operators 
Developers should always avoid usage of concatenated operators since they are very 
confusing and therefore make code error prone. Examples would be 
239 int i; 
240 int k = 10; 
241   
242 i = -++k; //(k plus 1) negated 
243 i = ++i; 
244 i = i+++k; //Confusing: Which one is incremented? i or k?  
245 i = i++-k; //Same problem, which one is incremented? 
Figure 6.35: Confusing operator usage 
 
6.1.16.3. Comma Operator 
Comma operator in C/C++ is used to merge multiple operations in one syntactic 
operation. For instance, such a code is valid C++ code: 
246 func(iParam1, (i=rand(),--i, i <<= 2)); 
Figure 6.36: Sample code using C comma operator 
 
“func” is a C++ function taking 2 parameters. First parameter is what “iParam1” 
variable happens to hold, second parameter is a calculation performed as assigning 
“i” a random value, decrementing it and left shifting it twice. 
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Although it allows interesting operations to be done in limited space, its usage is 
discouraged since it makes code harder to read and confusing. For instance, please 
consider following example: 
247 i = k = 10, k-=2; 
Figure 6.37: Sample confusing code using C comma operator 
 
It is hard to tell if “i” and “k” are assigned to 10 and k is subtracted by 2; or if “k” is 
assigned to 10 and subtracted by two and assigned to “i”. What actually happens is 
first case, at the end of these operations, “i” will have value 10 and “k” will have 
value of 8. 
6.2. Function Level 
6.2.1. Formatting and Commenting 
6.2.1.1. Code is for computers, format and comments are for humans. Since code is 
still written manually by humans, correct usage of formatting is very important to 
ensure correct human behavior: That is correct coding. We state that correct and high 
quality comments will help raising confidence level during the fixes in maintenance 
phase. We support this statement with a survey and provide guidelines for high 
quality comments. 
6.2.1.2. Approach to the subject 
Author prepared a survey for investigation of formatting and commenting usage 
among developers. This research is done to support below discussion. 
27 professional developer has attended the survey. Questions and reply distributions 
are below. 
• Did you ever find a bug thanks to good formatting of code 
o Yes, a lot (19) 
o Yes, only a few times (5) 
o No (3) 
• Do you try to write highly readable code during development 
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o Always (17) 
o Sometimes (10 –Attendees commented that they write readable code 
depending the importance of the code. This habit is very bad indeed, 
because any single line of defective code reduces quality and can 
cause vulnerabilities.) 
o No (0) 
• Do you believe that you write enough comments while writing the code 
o Yes (13) 
o No (14) 
• Do you write comments only to satisfy requirements  
o Yes (2) 
o Mostly (4) 
o Sometimes (10)  
o No (11) (Most teams did not have such requirement guidelines) 
• Do you think there are enough comments in the code you are working on 
o Yes (18) 
o No (9) (Interestingly, attendees who replied as “no” were working in 
sustained engineering groups, while most of the “yes” were working 
in development groups.) 
• Have you ever noticed that you have written a code with security 
vulnerability 
o Yes (8) 
o No (19) (We don’t believe that most of the attendees had qualified 
knowledge of distinguishing regular bugs from security 
vulnerabilities.) 
• Did anybody else noticed that you have written code with a security 
vulnerability 
o Yes (5) 
75 
o No (22) 
• Do you think that correct formatting and commenting can prevent security 
vulnerabilities 
o Yes (20) 
o Sometimes (7) 
o Negligible (0) 
Results of this survey are discussed in the next sections. 
6.2.1.3. Formatting 
Survey revealed that developers try to write code with correct format and they 
believe that correct formatting reveals code defects more easily.  
Formatting is a taste that differs from developer to developer. Although there are 
standards for commenting, habits mostly shape the output of code. It is a good thing 
that development environments help enforcing a standard in formatting by 
automatically updating written code.  
A very important aspect of formatting is consistency. Tricky indents or parentheses 
can easily turn into illusion because of accustomed eyes. 
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248 if (...) { 
249  ab... 
250  cd... } 
251   
252 some_op.. 
253   
254 if (...) { 
255  ef... 
256  gh... } 
257   
258 some_op.. 
259   
260 if (...) 
261  ij... 
262  kl... 
263   
264 some_op.. 
Figure 6.38: Example of Vulnerability Caused By Bad Formatting 
 
In the previous code snippet, line 262 is not in the “if” block, though it seems so. 
This can cause a security vulnerability, if, for example, “kl” is used to hold buffer 
size. 
Formatting should be done in a way that prevents increased visual size of code. If the 
code gets longer and longer, important parts of code fall apart; most notably variable 
declarations and usage of them.  
A less known habit is using spaces instead of tab characters to indent code lines. 
Advantage of this is preventing format brake in different tab sized environments. 
6.2.1.4. Commenting 
Unfortunately, same comments as formatting are not valid for commenting. 
Developers want to see more comments in the code they are working on, but they do 
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not take care of it themselves. Some of the attendees replied that they are writing 
comments because they have to. From this response, we can conclude that they do 
not care about comment quality enough. 
Basic principle of commenting is writing just enough and informational correct 
comment. Following example gives an example of bad commenting. 
265 //declare integers 
266 int i, j, k; 
267   
268 //assign values 
269 i = 2; 
270 j = 3; 
271   
272 //add two integers 
273 k = i + j; 
Figure 6.39: Example for Bad Source Code Comments 
 
Only repeating obvious operations is not good at all. A better commenting practice is 
shown below: 
274 //Initialization of this member is compulsory, see MSDN 
275 OsVersion.Size = sizeof(OsVersion); 
276   
277 //OsVersion is cast to ex version,  
278 //This is safe as documented in the manual at 
“GetVersionInfoEx” 
279 GetVersionInfoEx((OSVERSIONINFOEX *) & OsVersion); 
Figure 6.40: Example for Better Source Code Comments 
 
A good comment should be written keeping in mind that reader of the comments will 
be most probably somebody else. Moreover, that will most likely happen during 
maintanance phase and therefore reader will be quite strange to the code Because of 
that, good comments must mention about  
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• dependencies (we think that these are most valuable comments that are at the 
code level),  
• reasons of unclear decisions,  
• summary of historic bugs, 
• high risk zones, 
• possible race conditions (we think that these are most valuable comments that 
are at the function level), 
• performance considerations. 
6.2.1.5. Additional Discussion about the Survey Results 
We also noticed that requirements about comment count only bloats the code without 
adding any useful information. Good commenting can hardly be enforced. We 
believe that commenting must be thought. One of the best ways (and possibly time 
consuming) is sending developers to sustained engineering groups for hands on 
training. 
Although not shown neither in questions nor replies, most of the attendees admit that 
they write comments concurrently with the writing of code and never visit them 
back. Although concurrent commenting has significant advantages, they quickly 
diminish if they have never visited back. 
6.2.2. Kernel Mode Access Checks 
An unhandled exception in kernel mode will cause system crash, i.e. blue screen in 
Windows, core dump in Linux. No user process should be allowed to manage to 
bring kernel to undefined state and cause crash. However, if user mode input values 
are not validated and access to them are not guarded, this can happen. 
Please inspect following example: 
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280 BOOL GetSystemPageSize(unsigned int * puiRetVal) { 
281  if (NULL == puiRetVal) 
282    return false; 
283  
284  try { 
285   if (GetKernelPageSize(puiRetVal) == FALSE) 
286    return FALSE; } 
287  catch (...) { 
288   return FALSE; } 
289  
290  //Validity of puiRetVal can change after executing 
previous 
291     //code but before executing next code. 
292  
293  //Assuming system page size is twice as kernel page size 
294   *puiRetVal *= 2; } 
Figure 6.41: Sample vulnerable kernel mode code 
 
If caller is just a bad programmer passing corrupt pointers, then this code will work 
just fine. On the other hand, if the caller is planning an attack to kernel and trying to 
crash the system, he will certainly succeed. Please note that developer checked for 
validity at the beginning of the function by guarding with exception handling 
mechanism. However, on line 293, out parameter is modified without exception 
handling guard. If the attacker manages a race condition and changes status of that 
page during check and reuse, it will manage to crash the system. He does not need 
any privilege; just executing a program will cause system crash.  
6.2.3. Exception Safety in C++ and in C with SEH 
If used properly, exceptions are good at reporting errors noisily and timely. However, 
broken execution path can have negative impact on completeness of transactions.  
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6.2.3.1. Main Problem 
It is very difficult to know where an exception can be thrown. There are C++ 
annotations to declare functions as throwing or not throwing exceptions. It even 
allows specifying what type to throw. However, even modern compilers do not give 
importance to this feature and do not enforce compliance even if exception 
specification are present in the code. Static code analyzers could use this 
information; however, they are not good at that either if throwing level is deeply 
nested or in other modules, of which source code is not available. Worse, C language 
does not even have that feature. Maybe worst case, operations like division or 
floating-point arithmetic can raise exceptions even there is no function call visible.  
Unexpected exception throws result in broken flow of code execution, which leaves 
class states in unexpected states. It might be possible to design classes stateless (i.e. 
idempotent), but designing function internals that way is very difficult and 
sometimes not even possible. 
6.2.3.2. Case Study 
For instance, please see following code snippet (Assume that operator new is set to 
exception throwing mode): 
295 class String { 
296 private: 
297  char * szStr; 
298 public: 
299  ... 
300  String& operator = (char *szRight) { 
301   size_t cRightLen; 
302   cRightLen = strlen(szRight); 
303   delete [] szStr; 
304   szStr = new char[cRightLen + 1]; 
305   strcpy(szStr, szRight); } 
306 }; 
Figure 6.42: Example for Exception Safety 
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Line 303 deletes old string pointer and line 304 creates a new one. If there is not 
enough memory at that time, “new” will throw an exception. After that point, object 
of string class will be in undetermined state.  
6.2.3.3. Prevention 
There are several methods to prevent this from happening. Most straightforward 
method is having an exception handler in the function. Handler will ensure the 
completeness of transaction and then re-throw the exception to its caller. This 
method will increase code size unnecessarily by putting exception handler code. 
Furthermore, to allow this method work, most of the used variables need to be 
assigned initial values, which increases code size and runtime cycle consumption 
even more. Unfortunately, C++ language does not have a “finally” keyword. That 
keyword, which is present in some languages and in Windows OS Structured 
Exception Handling mechanism, allows adding checkpoints to the code. Checkpoints 
are always executed upon exit of guarded code, it is guaranteed by the language or 
operating system. “Finally” blocks are mostly used to guarantee proper clean up. 
A better method is rearranging function calls to make functions inherently exception 
safe. This method is best solution if it is possible and done properly. However, 
developer must be very careful to ensure correct order.  
Another approach is taken by C++ template library. In essence, that method consists 
of creating a temporary object, successfully constructing it, and then replacing its 
contents with a non-throwing member function. Following code is a demonstration 
of this method: 
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307 class String { 
308 private: 
309  char *_szStr; 
310  
311 public: 
312  String(const char *szStr) { 
313   size_t cLen = strlen(szStr); 
314   _szStr = new char[cLen + 1]; 
315   strcpy(_szStr, szStr); } 
316   
317  ~String() throw() { 
318   delete [] szStr; } 
319   
320  void Swap(String &strOther) throw() { 
321   std::swap(this->_szStr, strOther._szStr); } 
322  
323  String& operator = (const char *szStr) { 
324   Swap(String(szStr)); } 
325 }; 
Figure 6.43: Example for Exception Safety Improvement 
 
Line 324 can throw an exception, but it is not important. If creation of temporary 
object finishes without throwing any exception, non-throwing “String::Swap” 
operation is called and contents of that string is acquired. Old contents of old string 
are pushed into temporary object, which guarantees release of old resources. Please 
note that destructor is no throwing as well. Although very elegant, this method is not 
applicable to every case, notably for the functions, which are not involved in object 
creation.  
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6.2.4. Function Reuse 
6.2.4.1. Reusing Code whenever Possible 
Verifying correctness of a function is difficult; verifying correctness of two functions 
is even more difficult. Reuse code whenever possible; try not doing same thing 
twice. If there is a sequence of operations repeated in different locations of source 
code, put those sequence of operations in a function and call that function. This will 
make change applying easier and prevent omitting changes.  
On the regressions side, this approach can be good or bad. Now there will be more 
dependencies to functions overall the source code. If internal logic of one function is 
changed, this will effect whole application, which can be bad or good depending on 
the circumstances. This change will be reflected uniformly to whole application and 
all dependents will be updated accordingly. However, code not expecting such a 
change can be effected in a bad way and this cause regressions. To prevent this from 
happening, each function should be designed according following principles [40]: 
◊ Do one thing and do it well: 
This idea is motto of UNIX community. Functions should not overwhelm themselves 
by trying to do more things it is supposed to do. Otherwise, it will complicate error 
handling and rollback in case of exceptions. Serviceability and maintenance will be 
easier. Moreover, reusability of the code will be higher.  
◊ Functions should be black box: 
What is meant here is that functions must be transparent to the input and users should 
not be required to know internals of functions. Only API reference should be enough 
to fully use the function. For instance, if function allocates memory, users should not 
be kept responsible of keeping track of those resources. We understand that this can 
be difficult with C++; however, automatic pointers help with resource collection. 
◊ Decorate non-idempotent functions: 
Idempotent functions do not change state of program. Their next output is 
independent of previous calls (How many times and with which parameters it is 
called). On the other hand, non-idempotent functions bring the program to a new 
state. They must be processed as transactions, complete commit or rollback 
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mechanisms should be implemented. To make users aware of nature of functions, a 
naming convention can be used. Best naming convention is probably using “const” 
identifiers in C++. 
6.2.4.2. Use Default Parameter Values instead of Function Overloading 
C++ and some other languages allow defining some of the parameters of a function 
default at the compile time. If compiler sees that the programmer is not supplying a 
parameter, it uses default values.  
For instance, on the sample below, “OpenHttpServerPort” function can take 
configuration options on different granularity. To support this, four different versions 
(Lines 326, 328, 331 and 334) of the almost same code are rewritten. Functions with 
less parameters (coarse granular) obviously have predefined default variables to be 
used when opening socket (because, operating system will request some value). 
These functions can easily be merged into one single function using default 
parameter values. 
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326 bool OpenHttpServerPort( 
327  const int iMaximumCalls); 
328 bool OpenHttpServerPort( 
329  const int iMaximumCalls, 
330  const unsigned short usLocalAddressIndex); 
331 bool OpenHttpServerPort( 
332  const int iMaximumCalls, 
333  const unsigned short usLocalPort); 
334 bool OpenHttpServerPort( 
335  const int iMaximumCalls, 
336  const unsigned short usLocalAddressIndex, 
337  const unsigned short usLocalPort); 
338   
339 bool bool OpenHttpServerPort( 
340  int iMaximumCalls, 
341  const unsigned short usLocalAddressIndex = 0, 
342  const unsigned short usLocalPort = 80); 
Figure 6.44: Reducing function matrix with default parameter usage 
 
A parameter that is considered to be assigned a default value must really have a 
reasonable default value that will not change. For instance, giving interest parameter 
a default value in a tax return calculation function is probably a bad idea, because 
interest values change yearly. A programmer might think that this function has 
default parameter and might not supply current value resulting in wrong calculations, 
which are very hard to figure out. What is not seen is hard to debug. Moreover, it is 
very important to set default values to be compatible with all possible other 
parameters. Since callers are allowed to leave them blank, they must have 
meaningful values. 
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6.3. Software to Write Software 
Tools used for software development present tremendous amount of importance for 
high quality releases. On the extreme (and unlikely nowadays) case, low quality 
compiler will produce erroneous code. Tools can make certain tasks much easier (or 
even possible) compared to doing by hand. 
6.3.1. Development Platform 
6.3.1.1. Integrated Development Environments 
On the very old days, programmers were punching holes in cards to write codes. 
Fortunately, these days are long over and there are many sophisticated tools for 
programmers. These tools are combining many facilities a developer would need 
during implementation phase of a project. Therefore, they are called integrated 
development environments, or shortly IDE. A good IDE should provide: 
A good source text editor with 
• Code highlighting to make it easier to distinguish different elements of code. 
Normally, in common environments, only keyword highlighting is present. 
However, highlighting string constants in the source code is very important, 
too. On the other hand, a program called SourceInsight parses the code as a 
compiler does, and highlights, underlines, italicizes, and makes bolder to a 
very granular level.  
• Basic syntax checking; this will cut unnecessary compiling times to learn that 
there is no keyword in C called “strct”.  
• Warnings against deprecated API’s. 
• Simple yet useful features like source code commenting / un-commenting, 
auto indentation, and style checking, etc. Furthermore, it must support code 
auto formatting as well. Some tools allow to format a code to a predefined 
format.  
• A fast, optimizing (both for space and/or speed) compiler capable of 
producing correct and meaningful error/warning messages and capable of 
producing absolutely error free binary file representation of supplied source 
code. Run time code checks are a very welcome improvement. We do not 
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expect too much from an IDE’s built-in compiler. After all, release bits can 
be compiled with a compiler of custom selection. 
• A fast, optimizing linker. 
• A powerful debugging engine capable of source code and assembly 
debugging with use of full symbols and modifying source code during 
debugging. 
• Integrated and complete help for IDE itself, programming language and 
supplied libraries. 
A good IDE with above-mentioned features will keep a programmer concentrated to 
its job by making tasks shorter, more intuitive and easier. 
6.3.1.2. Simulators 
The earlier the code is tested, the better it is in terms of quality and costs economy. 
Some software projects will require specialized hardware to test it. However, this 
hardware could be very expensive to dedicate one to each of the programmers / 
testers; or it may not be available until later phases of the project. Using a simulator 
to increase the number of testers or to begin testing earlier is advised. However, 
simulators present many weaknesses.  
First, they are slower than the original hardware. This will give wrong estimates of 
performance and may hide some of the race conditions. 
The correctness and exactness of simulator are essential, yet it is hard to test and 
verify; testing the code against incorrect simulator would cause very unpleasant 
surprises to the end of the project. Testers using distrusted simulator will end up 
running tests against both the simulator and actual hardware, just time consuming 
and result confusing. 
6.3.1.3. Profilers 
Readers might wonder why profilers are mentioned in a thesis about secure 
programming. Over optimizing or optimizing in wrong places manipulates the code 
extensively and can result in code defects. As a rule, each code defect can end up 
being security vulnerability. 
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A project should be optimized during requirements phases by cutting off unused 
features, unneeded flexibility or unneeded scalability. This also reduces attack 
surface in the future. Design phase also presents opportunities like choosing better 
algorithms or defining synchronization bottlenecks better. During implementation, 
optimization can be done at two levels: algorithm and source code. 
May be the best summarization of choosing more complex algorithms is stated by 
Rob Pike in his Notes on C Programming: 
Rule 1. You can’t tell where a program is going to spend its time. Bottlenecks occur in 
surprising places, so don’t try to second guess and put in a speed hack until you have proven 
that’s where the bottleneck is. 
Rule 2. Measure. Don’t tune for speed until you have measured, and even then don’t unless 
one part of the code overwhelms the rest. 
Rule 3. Fancy algorithms are slow when n is small, and n is usually small. Fancy algorithms 
have big constants. Until you know n is frequently going to be big, don’t get fancy. (Even if n 
does get big, use Rule 2 first.) 
Rule 4. Fancy algorithms are buggier than simple ones, and they are much harder to 
implement. Use simple algorithms as well as simple data structures. 
Rule 5. Data dominates. If you’ve chosen the right data structures and organized thongs 
well, the algorithms will almost always be self evident. Data structures, not algorithms, are 
central to programming. 
Optimizing a code at the source code level, on the other hand, is usually harder and 
less efficient. Over-optimizing a piece of code is in particular very dangerous. Hand 
optimized code gets harder to understand, prone to bugs and very rigid. They usually 
have many predefined limits and constants, several assumptions and shortcuts; these 
are generally traits of fragile source codes. It is very reasonable to fine tune 
performance bottlenecks even at the assembly level to squeeze every possible CPU 
cycle; however, this should be done only if it is proven to be needed. A working 
implementation should exist in order to be able to prove, otherwise, there would be 
only guessing; a method that has no place in a serious engineering practice.  
Profilers can help developers to have a profile of their application. With better 
picture of bottlenecks and regions of code that needs optimization, a developer can 
pinpoint what to optimize and how much to optimize. Most likely, after setting 
profiler, developer will perform scenario based testing; this could be handing off the 
application to a real life end user or mounting it to the environment that reflects the 
environment the application will be running on once shipped. After several hours of 
data collection, profiler will give results. After correctly analyzing the results, 
developer will less likely tend to over optimization. 
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6.3.1.4. Sand Boxes 
Sand box is an isolated private space for a piece of code. A sand box will provide an 
environment, complete set of global dependencies and local dependencies. That 
piece of code will “feel” like it is in real life executing in the middle of the process. 
This capability is very useful to test functions in customized scenarios. Sometimes, it 
can take long time to bring an application to desired state. For instance, assume that 
memory stress handling code is subject to test. Without using any tools, a real stress 
scenario can be realized, which normally requires ample resources. On the other 
hand, isolating that piece of code and giving it an environment suffering from 
memory shortage will make testing much easier. 
6.3.2. Debuggers 
6.3.2.1. NTSD / CDB 
NTSD and CDB are two Microsoft provided very similar command line debuggers 
that use same debugger engine. They are extremely powerful and provide everything 
a debugger can provide. They are updated frequently and are available for different 
platforms. They come with a very good, actually helping help file, which demystifies 
many hard-to-understand features of these powerful engines. On the downside, 
however, command line user interface is not attractive to many users and makes 
usage harder than GUI tools. 
6.3.2.2. WinDBG 
WinDBG is using same debugger engine as NTSD and CDB, however it provides a 
graphical user interface. Although user interface is not very exciting nor intuitive, it 
still provides the flexibility of NTSD/CDB in an easier to use environment. 
6.3.2.3. Symbol Files 
Symbol files include type, address and line information of source files. When used 
with a debugger, it can help debugger to provide resolved stack information (call 
stack, local parameters, return values) and line number in the source of current code. 
Not all symbol files present same amount of information. While private symbol files 
will generally provide detailed information about binary, release editions of symbol 
files will include only parameter names, not the types.  
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Full symbol file generation is crucial for in the field debugging. Otherwise, 
debugging will require huge amount of disassembly and heuristics. 
Microsoft has a public symbol server on the web. To further analyze system calls and 
call stacks, environment variable for symbol server (_NT_SYMBOL_PATH) can be 
provided as: 
srv*c:\cache*http://msdl.microsoft.com/download/symbols; 
6.3.2.4. Effective Usage of Debuggers 
Although effective usage of debuggers is an important skill in secure software 
development, it is beyond scope of this thesis. However, readers are strongly 
encouraged to develop their debugging skills if they do not feel competent and 
comfortable. Debugging will open a new door to the internals of binary, which after 
all executes in the machine. 
6.4. Libraries 
6.4.1. Motivation 
Developers use libraries to increase code reuse and cut from development time. 
Taking advantage of existing functionality is good idea unless that functionality does 
not bring its security threats with it. There is a saying that goes, as “Being able to ask 
is half of knowing.” If developer is not aware of the potential vulnerabilities in the 
libraries that are used, otherwise secure code could be poisoned with external code.  
Aim of this section is not being a substitution for the documentation of those specific 
libraries. Such a goal would be repeating old work and would not provide any useful 
data. Rather, the goal of this work is stressing out deficiencies of some highly 
popular C/C++ libraries. Sometimes, usage of a certain library is unavoidable; this 
work also gives information how to use possibly insecure libraries safely. 
6.4.2. Previous Work 
Documentations of specific libraries are good resource for the capabilities of that 
library. However, some of the popular libraries are old and therefore their 
documentation lacks information about secure usage of those libraries.  
91 
Design Patterns [14] gives information about how to adapt old behavior to the 
desired new one. However, that book was obviously written without security in 
mind, and it can be difficult for the reader to pinpoint specific tips. Design Patterns 
section of this thesis covers that shortage and it can be a good reference while 
reading this section. 
We are unaware of any related work about this subject in academic environments. 
6.4.3. Correct Thread Model 
6.4.3.1. Single Thread 
Single threaded libraries are not designed for concurrent calls. They are not reentrant 
and depend on shared global variables. Concurrent calls will corrupt internal state of 
library and will result in errors. However, they are usually faster than their multi-
thread capable counterparts are, because they are not overwhelmed with 
synchronization code. Usage of single-thread capable libraries is discouraged; there 
may be functions that create different threads under the hood. For example, calls to 
COM, ODBC and RPC will create threads not visible to programmer, and their 
callback will stress single-threaded libraries since they will be happening on some 
other concurrent thread. 
6.4.3.2. Multi Thread 
Multi-threading capable libraries are a little bit slower than their single-thread 
capable counterparts are. However, they are the good way to go if the programmer 
cannot be sure that the program is and will be only single-threaded. 
6.4.4. Private Libraries 
6.4.4.1. Input Trust Decision 
All public input to libraries should be considered unsafe. Private calls with internal 
data, or validated public data can be considered in the trust domain, thus input can be 
taken safe. However, problem is forgetting boundaries of trust, i.e. which function is 
private, which one is not.  
One suggested method to even distinguishing private and public entry points is 
decorating private functions, such as prefixing with underscore “_” or “p_”. This will 
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help ringing bells when passing not validated input to some private function. Public 
functions (without this decoration) should validate each and every one of input 
parameters before passing to (decorated) private functions.  
Public functions passing not validated input to public functions are delegating 
responsibility of validation, which can be considered safe if called public function is 
written safe. It is reasonable to delegate such a responsibility (for performance 
reasons, validation can be time consuming and duplicate validations can cause 
unnecessary performance drops) provided that ownership of these responsibilities is 
well known. 
6.4.4.2. Memory Checking 
Windows API has several calls for checking validity of supplied pointers. They are 
listed below: 
343 BOOL IsBadReadPtr( 
344   const VOID* lp,  //Pointer to start of region to 
check 
345   UINT_PTR ucb);  //Length of region to check 
346 BOOL IsBadWritePtr( 
347   LPVOID lp,   //Pointer to start of region to 
check 
348   UINT_PTR ucb);  //Length of region to check 
349 BOOL IsBadCodePtr( 
350   FARPROC lpfn);  //Pointer to memory 
351 BOOL IsBadStringPtr( 
352   LPCTSTR lpsz,  //Pointer to start of region to 
check 
353   UINT_PTR ucchMax); //Length of region to check 
Figure 6.45: Pointer validity checking with Windows API 
 
These API calls can be used to verify pointers from third party libraries or user that is 
not trusted. However, the problem with these functions is that they are not thread 
safe (as documented in Microsoft Developer Network). What they are doing is not 
magic. For instance, it is easy to see what “IsBadReadPtr” doing from debugger 
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disassembly; it is trying to read 1 byte from each page of memory region in the guard 
of exception handling. If there is exception, it returns TRUE. Else, it exits from read 
loop and return FALSE. If there is another thread changing access permissions or 
freeing parts of memory, this function may not detect it. Correct usage of this 
function should involve critical section usage. 
Memory access check is, again, state handling problem. A function should not 
depend to any state of any pointer. It should try whatever it is supposed to do, if there 
is an access violation, virtual memory hardware will raise an exception and it will be 
caught whatever function is responsible. Such a stateless function should be written 
as exception safe, i.e. it should work as commit or rollback. It should take account 
that every line can possibly cause exception and if there is one, it should leave by just 
rolling back, rather leaving dependent variables in an undefined state. This thesis has 
mentioned about exception safety before, reader are urged to refer to that section if 
they have not done it so. Also [38] has good information about exception handling. 
6.4.5. C Runtime Library 
C is an old language and it shows. Its widely accepted usage was well before 
establishment strong fundamentals software engineering practices. During 
standardization, committee had to stick on bad practices for the backward 
compatibility. Therefore, some of the function interfaces are unsafe in C standard 
library. For instance, strcpy() may overrun its destination buffer if source pointer 
points to a string that is longer than destination buffer, because there is no way to 
know length of destination buffer and stop copying. Similarly, strcat () and gets () 
may overrun their destination parameters.  
C runtime library functions have Unicode and multi-byte counterparts in Microsoft 
CRT; for instance, “strcpy” has two other variations: “wcscpy” for Unicode string 
copy and “_mbscpy” for multi-byte strings copy. These variations are unsafe, too. 
All variations unsafe functions in CRT are banned in major software companies and 
all new projects should declare them as deprecated in a header file; this will warn 
careless programmers against their accidental usage. 
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6.4.6. String Safe 
Windows SDK has a new set of string manipulation library, “String Safe”. This 
library declares many functions with enhanced buffer security and intended to 
replace the functions coming with C standard library [68]. A sample function will be 
examined to show approach and capabilities of this library.  
354 //C Style String Copy 
355 char* strcpy( 
356    char *strDestination, //Destination Buffer 
357    const char *strSource); //Source Buffer 
358   
359 HRESULT StringCchCopy( 
360     LPTSTR pszDest,  //Destination Buffer 
361     size_t cchDest,  //Length of Destination Buffer 
362     LPCTSTR pszSrc); //Source Buffer 
363   
364 HRESULT StringCchCopyEx( 
365     LPTSTR pszDest,  //Destination Buffer 
366     size_t cchDest,  //Length of Destination Buffer 
367     LPCTSTR pszSrc,  //Source Buffer 
368     LPTSTR *ppszDestEnd, //Ptr to End Of Destination Buffer 
369     size_t *pcchRemaining, //Ptr to Buffer for Remaining Space 
370     DWORD dwFlags);  //Option Flags such as 
371     // STRSAFE_FILL_BEHIND_NULL 
372     // STRSAFE_IGNORE_NULLS 
373     // STRSAFE_FILL_ON_FAILURE 
374     // STRSAFE_NULL_ON_FAILURE 
375     // STRSAFE_NO_TRUNCATION 
Figure 6.46: String-safe API example 
 
As seen above, regular strcpy () is replaced with StringCchCopy () which takes an 
additional parameter for destination buffer length to prevent possible buffer overruns. 
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However, there is also a more power version of this function that also enables further 
actions on error conditions.  
String safe library functions have two variations, one variation has “StringCch” 
prefix while the other one has “StringCb” prefix. “StringCch” functions measure 
length of string as item count, namely the count of available Unicode or ASCII 
characters. “StringCb” functions, on the other hand, measure the length with 
available byte count, which is different for Unicode strings; a Unicode buffer with 
100 bytes of available space can hold up to 50 Unicode characters. A good 
programming practice is using only “StringCch” functions and disabling “StringCb” 
functions with a “#define” statement before including String Safe “strsafe.h” header. 
Complete reference can be found on [42].  
6.4.7. C++ Standard Template Library (STL) 
STL is a safe, fast, good designed, easy to use library for C++ users, and it is 
standard. Only caveat with it is that some implementations are very obscure and 
really hard to debug. Some implementation (until recently, Microsoft’s for example) 
use internal naming schemes “_v” for all values and “_p” for all pointers which 
makes it very difficult to understand what is “_v” and what does point “_p”. Though 
implementation might be considered bug-free, this trait makes it harder to debug own 
code. However, this is only implementation dependent and not a fault of standard. 
6.4.8. Active Template Library (ATL) 
ATL is a Microsoft provided library consisting of helper functions for its COM 
technology and template functions for several data structure implementations.  
COM helpers and wrappers are really useful when developing COM applications as 
they reduce code load of the developer and implement repeated bulk parts of COM 
codes. Especially, threading models of COM is made very easy to program thanks to 
ATL. Moreover, Microsoft IDE Visual Studio has many wizards to help using ATL. 
There is nothing very interesting about template data structures. However, simplicity 
and clarity of their implementation must be credited if compared with template data 
structure functions of STL. They are not designed to be perfectly object oriented, 
therefore some less frequently code is not present. 
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6.4.9. Microsoft Foundation Classes (MFC) 
It is mainly a wrapper library among Microsoft Windows 32 user mode API’s and 
comes with Microsoft Visual Studio IDE. It gathers related API calls in object 
oriented fashion and therefore hides some of the inconsistencies of Win32 (They are 
there mainly because of backwards compatibility issues going back to eighties) API. 
Moreover, it encapsulates some rather error prone and difficult tasks and presents a 
clean easy-to-use interface. It has been preference in the field for a long time. 
Although it is thoroughly tested by library developers and in the field, vulnerability 
was found in its ISAPI  parser libraries. However, it is assumed that this should be an 
isolated case and library is considered safe.  
6.5. 64 Bit 
Previous work on this subject is mature. This thesis does not aim to repeat that work 
here, rather its existence as a security threat is presented.  
32-bit and 64-bit mixed code should be written very carefully since assignments and 
pointer calculations can yield to incorrect results. [19] does a great job proposing an 
automatic tool for detection. Furthermore, [41] is a very useful, publicly available 
product that performs source code level passive checking of 32/64 bit 
incompatibilities. [11] can be used to detect any misaligned pointers during runtime; 
however, this is possible only for debugging builds.  
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7. Verification 
7.1. Preventive Measures 
7.1.1. Assertions 
Electronic circuit schematics have test points with reference data. They are used to 
pinpoint defective electronic element. Idea of such test points, or assertions of certain 
locations of code came first from Alan Turing [46], and they are developed by Hoare 
and Dijkstra [45].  
376 class String { 
377 private: 
378  char * szStr; 
379 public: 
380  ... 
381  Empty() { 
382   assert(szStr != NULL); 
383   delete [] szStr; 
384   szStr = NULL; } 
385 }; 
Figure 7.1: An Assertion Sample 
 
Designer decided that performing “Empty” operation on an already empty string is 
not correct and should be avoided. Therefore, developer added this assertion at line 
382 to alarm if there is such a request. If execution gets past of this checkpoint, it is 
safe to assume that “Empty” operation is being done on a valid string object. 
Interesting thing with assertions is that they have volatile nature of being in the 
actual binary. Mostly, “assert” blocks are designed to be removed in optimized 
builds, since they are expected to have done their job during testing of the product 
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with debug version. This behavior is important to note, because an important check 
encapsulated as assertion will be removed in release build leaving code without a 
necessary check. [37] has a complete chapter that focuses on correct usage of 
assertions. Since it is considered one of the best articles about this subject, this thesis 
will not focus on correct usage of assertions. However, main point is using assertions 
to successfully develop trustworthy applications. 
7.1.2. RockAll Memory Manager 
RockAll is a memory manager that is designed to perform all memory requests of an 
application. It can switch to page-heap mode in runtime. Furthermore, it can detect 
majority of buffer overflows. This is done by injecting security cookies after memory 
blocks and checking those cookies on release of that memory piece. Some versions 
of C runtime library do the same, but this behavior is not standard.  
RockAll can be used to monitor and profile memory needs of an application since it 
can generate reports at the runtime. This memory manager can be used to determine 
near future needs of the application. 
7.2. Testing 
7.2.1. Structural Tests 
7.2.1.1. Fuzzing 
Fuzzing is a method to test entry points of functions or modules. Every entry point 
expects data according a predefined interface definition. With fuzzing, slightly 
modified packets are sent to the entry points to check their error handling capabilities 
and robustness.  
Simple fuzzers are just network noise generators; they do not understand underlying 
communication protocol. Many protocols have some sort of checksum control and 
simple network noise causes fuzzed packets to be discarded in the very early stages 
of parsing. Fuzzers, that are more complicated, generate or modify packets in the 
knowledge of implemented protocol, they even recalculate checksum. Their output 
penetrates much deeper and tests with broader coverage. 
Fuzzing is a very effective method of testing at the beginning stage of verification. 
First, it stresses error handling and input validation code, parts that usually is not 
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tested well. Second, forging specially crafted packets are actual attack mechanism of 
attackers. Fuzzing imitates this approach. Third, fuzzing is done with automation and 
hundreds of thousand of packets can be sent in a couple of days with enormous 
amount of permutation of errors. However, gain from fuzzing deprecates quickly; 
after fixing errors, fuzzing no longer finds any more errors and it just gets superficial 
testing same error handling code. 
7.2.1.2. Stress 
Some security vulnerabilities can rise (only) under stress conditions. Even in real 
life, attackers get more chance under stress conditions: airport security guards get 
distracted during peak hours and terrorists can sneak in. In stadiums, polices have to 
check too many people in too short of time, causing illegal items to be brought in. 
Software is no different from real life; although software does not get distracted, 
shortage of resources can cause it to malfunction.  
Attacks can range from denial of service (system cannot handle any more 
connections and either refuses new requests or crashes) to remote code execution 
(some security check may not be done because of resource shortage, not verifying 
return values results security breaches). 
There are many tools for stress testing, some of which are previewed in the next 
section. Every trustworthy computing project must involve stress testing during 
stabilization phase. 
7.2.2. Tools 
The purpose of this section is to make reader familiar with some of widely used 
tools. Tools are not covered with complete details and coverage is kept short 
intentionally. There will always be better tools with more features and giving more 
details would render this thesis out-of-date sooner. However, this section will make 
more developers aware of such tools and testing ideas. 
7.2.2.1. Page Heap 
In protected mode, memory is divided into pages and memory access is determined 
on page basis. Virtual memory hardware checks memory access with page size 
granularity. Usual size of each memory page is four kilobytes. Normally, when an 
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application allocates new memory from heap, heap manager reuses pages and returns 
pointers to unused parts of pages.  
 
Figure 7.2: Virtual memory mapping 
 
However, enabling page heap causes a different method to be used for more efficient 
error detection. New layout will be as follows. 
 
Figure 7.3: Page-heap allocation 
 
Each memory allocation requests will be satisfied with an additional page reservation 
and marking it inaccessible. Allocated memory sits on the border of inaccessible 
page. Addresses in the page boundary before that memory are also reserved and 
filled with an integrity check pattern. If there is a buffer overrun in the application, it 
will immediately cause to access violation and throw a non-continuable exception. If 
there is under run, pattern before memory location will be corrupted and check 
during memory free will throw an exception.  
Downside of page heap is that each memory allocation will cost at least 2-page size, 
namely 8192 bytes of allocations. 
7.2.2.2. Application Verifier 
This tool [11] helps developers “identify potential application compatibility, stability, 
and security issues”. It includes Page Heap and many other tests, which works 
together with a debugger and gives detailed information about behavior of tested 
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application. It pinpoints potential errors and security defects like determining when 
an application is creating objects and assigning ACL’s to that object. 
7.2.2.3. Tools from SysInternals 
M. Russinovich has been disassembling Windows for many years and developed 
great tools that are very hard to find somewhere else with those capabilities. Here, 
most popular of his tools are described briefly [7]. 
◊ FileMon 
This tool monitors interaction of application with file system. Developers can use 
these tools to understand their applications file system behavior, to detect 
unnecessary file operations, to detect temporarily stored insecure sensitive 
information and to determine which sources their applications are using in reality. 
◊ RegMon 
In Windows OS, application configuration is kept in a database called “Registry”. 
This tool monitors traffic between registry API and application. With this tool, it is 
possible to monitor unnecessary registry calls, to detect temporarily stored insecure 
sensitive information and to ensure that the application is reading correct registry 
keys. 
◊ Process Explorer 
This tool is a replacement for Windows Task Manager with providing much more 
information and ease of use. One advantage of Process Explorer is that it can show 
HANDLE information of processes; developers can check which handles are open to 
which sources at any given time. 
7.2.2.4. Network Monitors (AKA Sniffers) 
Network monitors capture traffic from wire, parse protocols to basic building blocks 
and display to the user. Although capabilities depend to vendors, they generally can 
filter out addresses and/or protocols, sort by time, length, port or addresses.  
Usage of network monitors is really helpful to understand real behavior of 
application on the wire. Sniffers really help for speed optimizations by detecting 
unnecessary context switches, duplicate packets, wire errors, random check-sum 
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failing, resending etc. However, they are also useful for security purposes, too: it is 
possible to check for unencrypted sensitive data, alignment of data and timing issues. 
Besides, inspecting wire data gives better understanding of lower layer protocols 
dynamics.  
While capturing network traffic, developers should be aware of switched 
environments. A network switch will pass traffic only for receivers on that port; it 
will filter out third party communication. If third party communication is important 
for analysis, switch port span must be used. Almost every switch with configuration 
interface allows this, if not, using a hub instead will solve this problem. 
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8. Deployment 
8.1. Motivation 
Shipment and installation of a program in a secure fashion is very important to 
ensure sustained quality of a software application. Bad deployment practices 
increases attack surface unnecessarily and render otherwise more robust software 
into a backdoor to the system.  
8.2. Previous Work 
Unique approach to the subject of this thesis revealed that there is less research than 
we think it is required. Advancements in this field are unfortunately limited with big 
software houses proprietary setup applications or install suites.  
8.3. Minimal Setup 
Bad default scripts of setup phase installs unnecessary features that will not be used 
by the user. Those unnecessary features increase attack surface and thus making 
systems vulnerable even if the system did not require that functionality in the first 
place. One of the examples can be default installation of IIS 5.0 with MS Windows 
2000 OS. IIS had its share of security vulnerabilities. Default installation has caused 
almost all of the computers to be vulnerable, even if the user is, say, an accountant 
and does not know anything about a web server. Same thing happened with enabled 
RPC endpoint listener even though there is no RPC server on the system. Blaster 
worm has caused serious damage to the economy and personal properties [20] [21] 
just because of this. 
Correct way of doing this is only installing absolute minimum functionality by 
default. Furthermore, setup frameworks should give enough information to the users 
to allow them to select only useful and required features for them.  
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8.4. Compiler Flags 
Compiler documentation provides detailed information about the product. However, 
this section aims to make developers aware of security related switched that 
compilers present to the developers.  Especially, this thesis is the only article, which 
makes developers aware of “struct member alignment vulnerability” in modern 
optimizing compilers. 
8.4.1.1. /GS Flag 
Latest versions of Microsoft C/C++ compilers provide an option called /GS. When 
this switch is supplied, right after function entry, compiler allocates extra space on 
the stack at the location before return address and fills this area with a dynamically 
generated (at the process entry) cookie. At the function exit, compiler also injects a 
small amount of code to check cookie value set at the entry. If cookie value is 
overwritten, so is return address probably, almost certainly due to buffer overrun. If 
buffer overrun is detected, a buffer overrun handler function is called (a default one 
is provided, however it is possible to change with “_set_security_error_handler”. 
Default one displays a message and terminates the process.) 
/GS flag is intended to reduce buffer overruns, not to completely prevent them. There 
can still be attacks, which can succeed despite this feature. However, this flag should 
be enabled on all builds, either debug or release. During verification phase, it can 
spot buffer overruns. During actual run time, it can prevent damage of a possible 
buffer overrun; attack will be turned into denial of service from privilege escalation 
or remote code execution. 
8.4.1.2. /ZpN Switch: Struct Member Alignment 
Default behavior of struct member alignment is compiler implementation dependent. 
Compilers are free to position struct members in the memory. They will optimize 
size wise or speed wise. Normally, this would not be a problem. However, if memory 
representation of a struct is going to be written to network, this matters.  
Assume that there is network protocol, which defines a primitive remote procedure 
call mechanism: 
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32             24               16                8                0 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
+ Function ID   + Time Out Value + Parameter 1    + Parameter 2    + 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
Figure 8.1: Sample network protocol 
 
Suppose that a developer has programmed this as follows: 
386 struct MyProto { 
387  unsigned char ucFunctionID; 
388  unsigned short usParameter; 
389  unsigned char ucTimeOut; }; 
390  
391 void RemoteShutdown() { 
392  MyProto Proto; 
393  
394  ZeroMemory(&Struct, sizeof(Struct)); 
395  
396  Proto.ucFunctionID  = 0x11; 
397  Proto.usParameter  = 0x2222; 
398  Proto.ucTimeOut  = 0x33; 
399  
400  unsigned int uiSize = sizeof (Proto); 
401  SendViaCurrentSocket(&Proto, uiSize); } 
Figure 8.2: Implementation of sample network protocol 
 
Programmer expects that this code will put HEX (11222233) to the network; 
however, result is compiler implementation defaults dependent. For example, 
compiler of Visual Studio will provide “sizeof (Proto)” as six and will send HEX 
(110022223300). What is happening here? Compiler aligned struct members to 
utilize RAM bus best.  
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If structure will be used as a memory template, then compiler must be tuned with 
switches to align struct members to one-bytes. This can be set with “/Zp1” flag in 
Visual Studio. 
8.4.1.3. /RTCc Flag 
Latest versions of Microsoft C/C++ compilers provide an option called /RTCc. When 
this switch is supplied, compiler injects code to check assignments against value 
losses. Assigning long variables to shorter ones generates an exception; where a 
programmer can attach a debugger and see what is going on.  
8.4.1.4. /RTCs Flag 
Latest versions of Microsoft C/C++ compilers provide an option called /RTCs. When 
this switch is supplied, compiler injects code to check frame pointers prior entering 
and after leaving functions. This is helpful to detect mismatched function call 
conventions like calling a function with cdecl although it is declared as stdcall. This 
flag also enables initialization of local variables to non-null values. 
8.4.1.5. /RTCu Flag 
Latest versions of Microsoft C/C++ compilers provide an option called /RTCu. 
When this switch is supplied, compiler injects code to reports when a variable is used 
without having been initialized. Variables that are not initialized will have random 
values and can result random behavior in different environments with different 
settings making error localization very difficult. This flag will detect them during 
runtime and break execution immediately by throwing an exception. 
8.4.1.6. /RTCv Flag 
Latest versions of Microsoft C/C++ compilers provide an option called /RTCu. 
When this switch is supplied, compiler injects code to report mismatched use of C++ 
scalar/vector new/delete operators. Scalar new should be matched with scalar delete, 
while vector new should be matched with vector delete; otherwise, heap corruption 
or memory leaks could occur. This flag will break execution by throwing an 
exception. 
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8.4.1.7. Summary 
Run time check flags are very easy to use and they are very effective to localize 
errors. However, they are incompatible with optimizations and they make code 
slower. Therefore, they should be used in debugging editions of binaries.  
/GS flag on the other hand, is different. Although it is essentially a run time check, it 
has not the limitations of other /RTC* counterparts. This flag should be used in 
debug and release code to prevent buffer overruns, thus to prevent taking advantage 
of security vulnerabilities. 
8.5. Secure By Default 
Applications should be deployed as secure as they can be as default. Some of the 
administrators may not be so knowledgeable that he can properly configure newly 
installed application to be secured. Moreover, configuration may be forgotten. In 
those cases, software will be vulnerable although it has not to be.  
Checklist should contain: 
• Disabling unused features,  
• Creating minimum amount of server sockets,  
• Disallowing guest user account by default, 
• Not allowing default user accounts, especially the ones with high privileges,  
• Setting up correct access control list entries, 
• Doing initial configuration during setup and not delaying after setup. This 
ensures “secure or not installed” assertion.  
8.6. Setup Package Signing 
Setup packages should be signed by manufacturers to prevent tampering with 
packages and thus protecting customers. This will also protect reputation of 
manufacturer; because customers will likely blame manufacturers since all they see 
will be XYZ company’s application giving damage to their computer. 
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8.7. Removing Sensitive Data After Uninstall 
Applications must be designed in a way that cryptographically erases sensitive and 
private data after removing the application. As always, what invisible is hard to 
detect and implement. Program installation is visible, and any missing file will be 
detected most probably because the application will not work properly. 
Unfortunately, if some of the important files remain, it will not be detected by the 
user or application. 
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9. Maintenance 
Shipping software is generally another start of worries: Maintenance.  
9.1. Motivation 
Original developers start developing the next version of the product. Maintenance 
gets responsibility of other people that is different from original team. Moreover, 
companies tend to use more talented and experienced developers in main branch, 
rather keeping them busy with old product. After all, companies made the profit they 
were planning. However, bad maintenance practices can cause regressions in the 
code.  
Regressions can cause security vulnerabilities that were not present in the original 
code. Proof of this can be found on security bulletins of major software houses. If 
looked carefully, it can easily be seen that most of the bulletins refer to only some 
version of a product. For instance, [45] is a security bulletin from Microsoft 
Corporation that addresses a security vulnerability that affects only a subset of 
operating systems. Obviously, this defect is introduced with a regression. 
Motivation for working on that phase comes from the fact that sustained quality 
engineering is as much as valuable as developing the application. 
9.2. Previous Work 
Software engineering science has studied maintenance phase thoroughly over the 
years. 
9.3. Regressions 
Every change in the code can have effects locally or globally. Local changes are 
generally expected and intended. However, global effects are rarely well understood 
or intended. Such side effects occur especially in the cases where several people 
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maintain a project with large code base that is not well modularized into independent 
parts. 
Regression is defined as new defects in the code base after changing code; new 
erroneous behavior will be present and software will fail tests, which it was passing 
before. Regressions can cause very bad security vulnerabilities. Unlike normal 
program features, real security of software is not visible, and it is always hard to test 
invisible. Security of rather large software is impossible to prove; only absence of 
security can be proven with a successful attack. Therefore, a regression passing all 
security and non-security tests can still be vulnerable to yet unknown attacks. 
9.3.1. Research on the Effects of Regressions 
In order to demonstrate effects of regressions, security bulletins are researched for 
indications of regression origin.  
9.3.1.1. Method 
For this purpose, all security bulletins since 2000 from Microsoft Corporation are 
examined. Regression indication is decided as follows: 
 If there is vulnerability, which only effects serviced products, or 
 If there is vulnerability, which only effects new version of the product but 
there has been no DCR. 
9.3.1.2. Results 
“Table 9.1: Security Improvement Research of Microsoft Corporation” presents the 
results of this research.  
Until 2003, Microsoft Corporation did not encounter high percentage of regression 
bugs. Even in 2003, affected software was mainly down-level platforms. With the 
increasing number of supported platforms and introduced changes to code base, 
regression bug counts started increasing. Percentage is increased from only 3% to 
28%. 
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Table 9.1: Security Improvement Research of Microsoft Corporation 
Years Total Bulletin Indicated Regression 
2000 100 3 
2001 100 6 
2002 72 5 
2003 51 4 
2004 44 12 
 
Another interesting result is that trustworthy computing initiative in 2001 of 
Microsoft Corporation has proved to be very effective. After 2001, count of security 
bulletins is drastically reduced. 
9.3.2. Regressions during Bug Fixes 
The biggest problem with bug fixes is regressions. A regression occurs when code 
change has unexpected side effects in other parts of code causing code defects. Since 
it is generally hard to tell where the next regression will show up, they are easy to 
miss during tests. 
Also should be noted that Systems suffering from high level of regressions are 
generally poorly designed system with high amount of cross dependencies. A 
developer unfamiliar with the project (old developer who has forgotten minor details 
of project or a new one stranger to the project) will have hard time in such systems. 
Therefore, fix triage should be made very carefully and selectively. 
9.3.2.1. Perfective 
Perfective bug fixes are the fixes that do not fix known or important issues. 
Developer thinks that that fix could be nice to have it and changes code. Although 
this type of changes can be acceptable at the early phase of development, it should be 
avoided as the code base matures. They can be exercised on service pack branch 
(service packs are really well tested), but they should be kept away from day to day 
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customer fixes (which normally has limited test coverage). It should be kept in mind 
that every change in the code can cause regressions somewhere else and decision 
should be made if the fix is worth of taking that risk. 
9.3.2.2. Corrective 
Corrective fixes are compulsory fixes due to customer requests, publicly known 
vulnerabilities or blocking issues. Since they must be performed, there is not an 
option for manager but accepting that requests. However, developers should resist 
the tendency of perfective fixes while working on a necessary one. First, this action 
will increase the chance of regression because that kind of “minor” perfective 
changes will be most likely less understood. Besides, it will make code reviews less 
effective and confusing. Second, porting this fix to another platforms or versions will 
be more complicated. 
9.3.2.3. Final Words 
An anonymous saying can summarize this section very good:  
“If not broken, don’t fix it” 
9.3.3. Detection: Code Reviews 
Every change should be checked with static code analysis tools and then send to a 
peer for code change review. According to the experiences of us, another look that is 
free of presumptions can be very effective while detecting errors. 
Review should be done by someone who has been involved in the project for long 
term and has a good deal of overall knowledge related to the project, especially about 
inter-module dependencies.  
A reviewer should look, besides other domain specific needs, for design of patch, 
correctness of patch, obvious and possible side effects of code change, 
implementation details, usefulness, fit within its module, fit within application 
globally, usage of API’s, banned API, commenting, and style. Furthermore, reviewer 
should verify changes for conformance to company policy and project handbook. 
9.3.4. Prevention: Bug Fix Check-Ins 
Each code check-in should fix exactly one bug, not anymore. This discipline will 
help tracing regressions back to the code change, which introduced that defect and 
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therefore making analysis of bug shorter. Keeping fix times shorter means high 
responsiveness to publicized attacks and keeping attack windows small. 
9.3.5. Prevention: Keeping Complexity Down during Implementation 
Regressions occur mostly because of high complexity of source code. Relatively less 
experienced developers are not familiar with the code and complex code base does 
not make their job any easier. Following simplicity techniques that were mentioned 
in Design and Implementation chapters helps to keep complexity at a manageable 
level. 
9.4. Design Change Request’s (DCR) 
Design of a product is done at the beginning of a project. After product is at the 
market, DCR is not a very welcome request. It has many threats in it: 
Difficult. It is very difficult to change an implementation written for another design. 
There will be many contracts among objects of the design. The requested change will 
probably break these contracts. Tracing references to contracts are very time 
consuming; in fact, covering every single one of them is almost impossible in a 
large-scale project. These changes will be very expensive and time consuming, for 
both development and verification.  
Decorator design pattern provides a method to add required features later.  
Error prone. Difficult jobs are error prone by their nature, and this is not an 
exception. Broken contracts will damage the structure of software. Compiling 
without any errors mean less, since contracts are not only interface base, but also 
behavior base. At the very least, owner ship of objects (pointers, handles, etc) is very 
important for a robust system; possibly broken contracts will make it very difficult to 
track ownership, double-free issues will begin to show up. 
Hard-to-test. Changed design and code base will require new test cases, which will 
take considerable time. Companies will not likely want to spend high amount of 
money and will rush to ship change. However, lack of test will result in errors, 
possibly security vulnerabilities. 
DCR’s should be listed for next major version of product when there will be large 
redesign / code change and long verification time.  
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10. Examination of Existing Vulnerabilities 
10.1. Motivation 
Author has given information about several methods to prevent security 
vulnerabilities throughout the thesis. In this chapter, goal is demonstrating 
effectiveness of the suggested methods. This has two advantages. First, reader can 
understand value of methods. Second, reader can relate suggested methods to real 
world problems.  
10.2. Approach to Subject 
To demonstrate effectiveness of methods, 18 of sample real life security 
vulnerabilities will be examined.  
10.3. Examples from Real Life 
10.3.1. MS00-001 "Malformed IMAP Request" Vulnerability 
This Description is taken from Microsoft Corporation TechNet web site 
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/Bulletin/MS00-001.mspx 
The IMAP service included in MCIS Mail has an unchecked buffer. If a malformed request 
containing random data were passed to the service, it could cause the web publishing, IMAP, 
SMTP, LDAP and other services to crash. If the malformed request contained specially 
crafted data, it could also be used to run arbitrary code on the server via a classic buffer 
overrun attack. 
 
Since we cannot reveal specifics about this code defect, discussion will be limited to 
overall buffer overrun aspect. 
Author has suggested usage of COM modules in risky parsing environments. IMAP 
can be considered risky because e-mail protocols were established a long time ago 
and therefore they are loosely formatted, making parsing a difficult job. If Microsoft 
Corporation had used COM modules to separate risky portion, arbitrary code 
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execution would not be a real security threat, because process would be running in a 
restricted environment. Attacker would be able to do only what the process is 
allowed to do, probably nothing but parsing input data.  
Although it was not available at those days, Microsoft Corporation C/C++ compiler 
/GS flag could potentially prevent a buffer-overrun vulnerability. 
10.3.2. MS00-005 "Malformed RTF Control Word" Vulnerability 
This Description is taken from Microsoft Corporation TechNet web site 
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/Bulletin/MS00-005.mspx 
RTF files consist of text and control information. The control information is specified via 
directives called control words. The default RTF reader that ships as part of many Windows 
platforms has an unchecked buffer in the portion of the reader that parses control words. If 
an RTF file contains a specially-malformed control word, it could cause the application to 
crash.  
 
This bug could have been prevented with following principle “tight tunnel”. RTF 
parser apparently is not checking its input correctly and this results invalid entries to 
find its way deep into the code. This bug is not a regular buffer overrun attack, 
because read data is not directly written to the buffer, but after some initial 
processing (Otherwise it would be a full-blown security vulnerability allowing 
attacker to run code in host process context). RTF parser should have checked 
validity of input and verify that it is indeed one of the valid control commands. 
10.3.3. Driver-Monitor Framework Unitialized Out Parameter Vulnerability 
This vulnerability has been present in one of the projects that the author of this thesis 
has developed. 
402 void ReadUserName( 
403     OUT szUSerName[32]) { 
404   
405     //Zero out parameters.. 
406     ZeroMemory(szUserName, sizeof(szUserName)); 
407     ... } 
Figure 10.1: Driver Monitor Framework Vulnerability 
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This vulnerability is caused because of improper size determination during zeroing 
out parameters. Sizeof(szUserName) statement returns whatever the size of regular 
pointer is, which is 4 in 32 bit platforms. Of course, the result is shorter than the real 
size of the parameter and therefore parameter ended up without being zeroed 
completely. Since this parameter was reused in other places, this has caused a 
security vulnerability, though hard to discover one. Fortunately, this vulnerability has 
not been exploited. 
10.3.4. Linux Kernel Backdoor Attempt 
There has been a attempt to plant a backdoor into the Linux kernel in 2003. Although 
this is not a security vulnerability in the sense of code defect, it could still be caught 
if one line code mistake catalog have been used as a checklist. Vulnerable code is 
below: 
408                 .. 
409                 .. 
410                 schedule(); 
411                 goto repeat; 
412         } 
413         if ((options == (__WCLONE|__WALL)) && (current->uid = 
0)) 
414                         retval = -EINVAL; 
415         retval = -ECHILD; 
416  end_wait4: 
417         current->state = TASK_RUNNING; 
418         .. 
419         .. 
Figure 10.2: Linux Kernel Backdoor Attempt Source Code 
What seems as an innocent comparison statement actually sets user id to zero, which 
is the id of the most privileged user account in Unix world. Hacker first checks to see 
if some special flags have been set, then set its user id. Since this is kernel code, 
modifying user tokens is that easy. A checklist of one-line code mistakes, or an 
automated tool which consumes that list could detect this defect right away. 
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However, Linux kernel source depot did not have such a sophisticated mechanism at 
that time and a human caught this error. 
10.3.5. Apache Web Server Chunk Handling Vulnerability 
Apache is a popular platform-independent HTTP 1.1 compliant web server that is 
mostly used in Unix environments, most notably Linux. There has been a 
vulnerability in 2002, description of vulnerability can be seen below [55]: 
Versions of the Apache web server up to and including 1.3.24 and 2.0 up to 
and including 2.0.36 contain a bug in the routines which deal with invalid 
requests which are encoded using chunked encoding.  This bug can be triggered 
remotely by sending a carefully crafted invalid request. This functionality 
is enabled by default. 
[54] is CERT report about this vulnerability. What is important about this defect is 
that it affects many versions of many products. 
Even in open source vulnerability reports, code defects are not mentioned with a 
good clarity to prevent encouraging attackers. Following examination is done by 
finding out defective and fixed versions, windiff’in them and inspecting source code. 
Old function to determine the chunk size: 
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420 static long get_chunk_size(char *b) 
421 { 
422     long chunksize = 0; 
423     while (ap_isxdigit(*b)) { 
424         int xvalue = 0; 
425  
426  /* This works even on EBCDIC. */ 
427         if (*b >= '0' && *b <= '9') 
428             xvalue = *b - '0'; 
429         else if (*b >= 'A' && *b <= 'F') 
430             xvalue = *b - 'A' + 0xa; 
431         else if (*b >= 'a' && *b <= 'f') 
432             xvalue = *b - 'a' + 0xa; 
433  
434         chunksize = (chunksize << 4) | xvalue; 
435         ++b; 
436     } 
437  
438     return chunksize; 
439 } 
Figure 10.3: Appache Vulnerability: Old Code 
 
New function for the same purpose can be seen at the next page. Besides the bug 
itself, we first want to note other improvements. Since this code has caused 
vulnerability, the programmer, who fixes the source code took additional 
countermeasures instead of just fixing the defect.  
First, curly braces are used to encapsulate even single line if-statements. This is a 
good coding style because it prevents accidental under-coverage or over-coverage. 
Second, Api export functions are noted with “ap_” prefix. Although we would 
suggest using namespaces, since the source file is C, prefixing function names are all 
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we have. Third, now there are spaces between the local variable definition and while 
loop. 
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440 API_EXPORT(long) ap_get_chunk_size(char *b) 
441 { 
442     long chunksize = 0; 
443     long chunkbits = sizeof(long) * 8; 
444  
445     /* Skip leading zeros */ 
446     while (*b == '0') { 
447         ++b; 
448     } 
449  
450     while (ap_isxdigit(*b) && (chunkbits > 0)) { 
451         int xvalue = 0; 
452  
453         if (*b >= '0' && *b <= '9') { 
454             xvalue = *b - '0'; 
455         } 
456         else if (*b >= 'A' && *b <= 'F') { 
457             xvalue = *b - 'A' + 0xa; 
458         } 
459         else if (*b >= 'a' && *b <= 'f') { 
460             xvalue = *b - 'a' + 0xa; 
461         } 
462  
463         chunksize = (chunksize << 4) | xvalue; 
464         chunkbits -= 4; 
465         ++b; 
466     } 
467     if (ap_isxdigit(*b) && (chunkbits <= 0)) { 
468         /* overflow */ 
469         return -1; 
470     } 
471  
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472     return chunksize; 
473 } 
Figure 10.4: Apache Vulnerability: New Code 
The bug itself could have been prevented by using remoting mechanisms that was 
mentioned in design phase. In Linux, there is no COM technology, but underlying 
structure is anyway there: Rpc. Since Rpc is a very efficient mechanism of inter-
process communication, its usage affects performance only marginally and linearly. 
HTTP parser could be in a non-privileged process. It would parse the requests and 
create an internal representation of parsed request. Then, privileged peer could 
process the request and perform tasks that require privilege. 
10.3.6. Apache Environment Expansion Vulnerability 
This code defect is in configuration file parsing logic. There is buffer overflow 
vulnerability if a specially crafted input file is passed to the Apache web server. This 
vulnerability is difficult to exploit, attacker must be local user and manage to 
command to server to parse his or her configuration file. Since the fixed code is long 
and involved, it is not included in this thesis. However, interested readers are 
encouraged to see the source code “.\server\util.c” and compare the versions 2.0.50 
and 2.0.51. Old version can be seen below: 
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474 AP_DECLARE(const char *) ap_resolve_env( 
475                             apr_pool_t *p, const char * word) 
476 { 
477        char tmp[ MAX_STRING_LEN ]; 
478        const char *s, *e; 
479        tmp[0] = '\0'; 
480  
481        if (!(s=ap_strchr_c(word,'$'))) 
482         return word; 
483        do { 
484                /* XXX - relies on strncat() to add '\0' 
485                 */ 
486                strncat(tmp,word,s - word); 
487                if ((s[1] == '{') && (e=ap_strchr_c(s,'}'))) { 
488                        const char *e2 = e; 
489                        char *var; 
490                        word = e + 1; 
491                        var = apr_pstrndup(p, s+2, e2-(s+2)); 
492                        e = getenv(var); 
493                        if (e) { 
494                            strcat(tmp,e); 
495                        } else { 
496                            strncat(tmp, s, e2-s); 
497                            strcat(tmp,"}"); 
498                        } 
499                } else { 
500                        /* ignore invalid strings */ 
501                        word = s+1; 
502                        strcat(tmp,"$"); 
503                }; 
504        } while ((s=ap_strchr_c(word,'$'))); 
505        strcat(tmp,word); 
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506  
507        return apr_pstrdup(p,tmp); 
508 } 
Figure 10.5: Apache Vulnerability: Environment String Expansion 
 
Although this defect is unlikely exploitable, it is included here nonetheless. What we 
consider as biggest mistake here is not the bug itself, rather the decision to use a 
proprietary environment expansion functions while there are plenty of 
implementation there. Linux kernel, most notably, has the highest quality examples 
of such routines. Programmer not only develops its own version, but also develops it 
with a known bad API such as ‘strcat”. If readers see the source code, they can be 
stunned because of the buffer overflow possibilities with such a recent release of 
Apache web server. 
10.3.7. Tacacs+ Server Vulnerability 
Tacacs+ is a network authentication, authorization and accounting protocol that is 
used especially in Cisco based networks. The author of this thesis has developed a 
version of Tacacs+ server in 2003. There was security vulnerability in the code that 
existed because of inconsistent usage of parameters among functions. Luckily, that 
piece of code was eliminated during testing. Problem is that some type of functions 
accepted timeout in milliseconds, while other functions accepted it in seconds. This 
could cause much longer waits in server code, which block threads. After a while, 
server would starve of threads and attacker could have managed denial of service 
attack. Clearly, this is against tight tunnel principles. Data must flow in the narrowest 
path possible. With different representation, it is given chance to flow in a broader 
channel. 
10.3.8. Vulnerability in MS Message Queuing 
Message queuing is used to enable inter platform communication over well-
standardized API’s. Differently than other technologies, it also supports guaranteed 
message delivery. This technology is mostly used in high-end critical servers. There 
is a publicly known vulnerability in Microsoft Corporation’s implementation of that 
technology. It is documented in [57] on April 14, 2005. Vulnerability in this 
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component is a buffer overrun that is caused by an unchecked buffer. An attacker, 
who exploits this vulnerability, can execute arbitrary code remotely of his or her 
choice. What makes this vulnerability critical (In our opinion. This is supported by 
public announcements of Microsoft Corporation in [57]) is that the injected code can 
do everything that an administrator can do locally on system console. This is possible 
because of the user account the MSMQ service is running in. In our opinion, biggest 
mistake here is putting a network service in SYSTEM account, the most powerful 
account in Windows environment. If high privileges were required, COM 
compartmentation could be used to establish boundary layer between modules with 
different privilege requirements.  
10.3.9. Rpc Blaster Worm 
Although this worm as known Rpc worm, the truth is not exactly that. Vulnerability 
existed in a Dll, which is called RpcSs.Dll. This Dll is responsible of MS COM 
technology implementation and Rpc component has only one feature there: Endpoint 
mapper. Endpoint mapper is helper functionality for Rpc; it resolves server endpoints 
from UUID’s. 
A buffer-overrun vulnerability is exploited in August of 2003 [60]. This worm is 
another instance where the damage is increased due to high privileges of the attacked 
process. Mitigation of restricted user account would make this worm less effective. 
Cost for each large enterprise is estimated over $7 million. Blaster worm could do 
much more than it was originally doing, which is performing DoS attack to 
WindowsUpdate.Com, public patch download site of Microsoft Corporation. Since 
the RpcSs runs in system context, possibilities are limitless. Even an unsuccessful 
attempt to inject code would most likely kill RpcSs process, which is critical system 
process and causes system to initiate shutdown. 
10.3.10. Traffic Analysis Vulnerability in SafeWeb 
SafeWeb is a public internet access proxy that is used to browse the web disguised. It 
has been used popularly in countries (like China), which prohibits free browsing of 
Internet. There is a publicly documented vulnerability in the product [59]. An 
extensive traffic analysis can reveal which IP address is visiting which site. Since IP 
addresses can be traced back to real persons, this causes serious functional 
deficiency. Attack is performed by recording network traffic to and from SafeWeb 
125 
servers. Than, each request is fingerprinted in the number of packets it contains and 
the sizes of packets. Future requests are compared with fingerprint database to 
understand who is connecting where. What is interesting about this vulnerability is 
that it can be a real threat to actual human life, since some of customers of SafeWeb 
reside in countries, which has extensive amount of death penalties. 
10.3.11. MS SQL Server 2000 Slammer Worm 
What makes this worm and Blaster worm so harmful and effective is that they do not 
require any kind of user interaction and they inject code to the processes those are 
running in highly privileged context. MS SQL worm is a vulnerability that is caused 
by a buffer overrun.  
10.3.12. Vulnerability in the License Logging Service 
License logging server is a component of Microsoft Windows Operating System and 
is used in Client Access License environments for backup purposes. There is buffer-
overrun vulnerability that is publicly known [62]. If successfully exploited, an 
attacker can take complete control of the system. What makes this case particularly 
interesting is the impact of vulnerabilities among systems. Although this component 
is almost in every major Windows version, latest Windows version as the time of this 
writing is considered not critically impacted. Cause of this is that the service is not 
enabled by default in Windows 2003 and only an administrator can enable this 
service. Although Windows 2003 has the same defective code, most of users of this 
version is not affected. This case is good example reducing attack surface practice. 
Following, excerpt from [62] can be seen. 
Vulnerability 
Identifiers 
Windows 
NT 4.0 
Windows 2000 
Server Service 
Pack 3 
Windows 2000 
Server Service 
Pack 4 
Windows 
Server 2003
License Logging Service 
Vulnerability - CAN-
2005-0050 
Critical Critical Important Moderate 
Figure 10.6: Impact Difference among Different Versions of Windows OS 
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The reason why Windows 2000 Service pack 4 is not critically affected is that server 
hardening guide for that particular version suggested disabling the service, although 
it was enabled by default.  
10.3.13. Named Pipe Vulnerability 
Named pipes are a transport layer protocol that is used in Windows environment 
frequently. There is a publicly known vulnerability in that functionality in Windows 
XpSp1 and XpSp2 [64]. This case is another example of reducing attack surface. 
Computer browser service is essential in order to exploit this vulnerability, but is 
disabled by default in Windows Xp service pack 2. 
Vulnerability Identifiers Windows XP Service 
Pack 1 
Windows XP Service 
Pack 2 
Named Pipe Vulnerability - CAN-
2005-0051 
Important Moderate 
Figure 10.7: Impact Difference Among Different Versions of Windows OS (2) 
 
10.3.14. Vulnerability in PNG Processing 
PNG is a portable graphic format that is widely used in Internet environment to share 
image files. Microsoft Windows Operating System has a publicly known 
vulnerability that is caused because of integer overflow while parsing input data [63]. 
An attacker can execute remote code by successfully exploiting the vulnerability. 
File parser vulnerabilities are especially dangerous because it is not the same kind of 
viruses that people are generally aware of. People expect harm from executables, 
batch files, and macros and even from scripts. However, users do not expect to be 
infected while browsing a web site that consists of just plain HTML and some 
images. This kind of attack is so effective that a system can be affected just because 
the user displayed an image. This and other similar vulnerabilities give several 
lessons: 
• An input should never be trusted 
• All input can cause vulnerabilities, even if the parser does not deal with 
networking or executable files.  
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• Common system components must have very high security standards since 
these components are being used by all users of the system. Moreover, they 
cannot be disabled or separated from the system. 
• An attack may come from least expected sources and may still have such an 
astounding audience. 
10.3.15. GDI+ Vulnerability 
A very similar and probably wider spread (because JPEG is more popular) attack was 
GDI+ vulnerability that occurred in 2004 [64]. This attack was more harmful than 
PNG because vulnerability existed in more than one product. Users had to go to 
official Windows update site. During visit there, a scanning tool was deployed to 
detect application that uses defective GDI+ libraries. However, that scanner could 
not scan all applications either; it was only compatible with products of Microsoft 
Corporation.  
10.3.16. Apache 2.0.49 64-Bit Vulnerability in Mime Parsing Code 
Since 64-Bit address, space and number limits are much larger than their 32-Bit 
counterparts are they increase visibility of code defects. One of such defect was 
present in Apache web server, which caused heap based overflow if successfully 
exploited. 
Complete source function will not be included here, since it is too long. However, 
added fix will be presented here. 
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509 if ((fold_len - 1) > r->server->limit_req_fieldsize) { 
510  r->status = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST; 
511  /* report what we have accumulated so far before the 
512  * overflow (last_field) as the field with the problem 
513  */ 
514  apr_table_setn(r->notes, "error-notes", 
515   apr_pstrcat(r->pool, 
516    "Size of a request header field "  
517    "after folding " 
518    "exceeds server limit.<br />\n" 
519    "<pre>\n", 
520    ap_escape_html(r->pool, last_field), 
521    "</pre>\n", NULL)); 
522  return; 
523 } 
Figure 10.8: Apache 64 Bit Vulnerability Code Patch 
 
Critical line is line number 509. This if statement ensures that current fragment 
length is not longer than the limits. In the absence of this limit, server could survive 
attacks in 32-bit platforms, since numeric range is much lower. However, with 64 
bits huge numbers, visibility of the defect increases. Therefore, we defended the 
importance of 64-Bit verification in our work. 
10.3.17. Linux Real Time Clock Vulnerability 
Real time clock functionality does not initialize their structures in Linux Kernel 
2.4.23 and earlier. This results in kernel data leak to user space [66]. We consider 
this defect because of not following tight tunnel principles correctly. Although a tight 
tunnel principle mostly defines runtime behavior, it should be noted that proper 
initialization is also an important aspect of tight tunnel principle.  
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10.3.18. Final Bug: Ping of Death 
Ping of death is one of the oldest and yet most effective attacks. Attack basically 
consists of a ping packet that is longer than legally allowed size, which is 216-
1=65535 bytes. This is possible because of fragmentation logic of IP packets. 
Receiving computer is attacked when assembling packet fragments into a single 
buffer. It makes sense to have a fixed size buffer for IP packets, because there is an 
absolute limit in the size of packets. Therefore, many implementations had a buffer 
size of 16 bits. Overwriting this buffer caused different effects on different systems.  
The interesting thing about ping of death is the low quality of TCP/IP stacks just 10 
years ago. Imagine that an attacker can crash any computer with just a ping packet. 
That is an awesome power, attacker does not need to know anything but the IP 
address. We added this bug here to demonstrate how far the computer technology is 
advanced in means of security in the last decade. 
10.4. Which Failures and Defects Are More Critical 
This question has been discussed for a long time among academic environments and 
no one seems to have a correct and only answer. Reason for that is there is a huge 
problem in the security assurance of software products: In theory, even the smallest 
amount of defects can cause serious security vulnerability. In addition, this defect 
does not have to be in the design or deployment phase either. Any of the one-line 
code defects can open the doors for remote code execution attacks. This is very 
unlikely to other engineering disciplines that we are used to. For instance, nobody 
would expect a bridge collapsing because of a single forgotten bolt. However, very 
unfortunate for software, delicacy of code harmony makes software very fragile. 
Important thing is in which context the program is running in and the location of 
defect.  
One argument is that some sorts of defects are more important compared to others 
are. If thought superficially, this sounds right, because most of the security bulletins 
talk about buffer overruns after all. Therefore, can we say that unchecked buffers are 
most critical errors? Not quite likely, we think; a very important issue is omitted 
here: An integer overflow can cause a buffer overrun, too. Unintentional assignment 
operator in an if-statement can cause integer overflow, too. In addition, bad style can 
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cause unintentional assignment operator in the if-statement. Finally, bad design spec 
that does not dictate a style can cause bad styling. Everything is in a fragile harmony, 
and therefore software security consists of total quality. 
We believe that any categorization of defects and mistakes should be taken as rough 
guidelines only and should not be considered as a serious reference. Since code bases 
are very large, bad surprises are happening always. With sensitive building blocks 
upon each other, software becomes as a house build from playing cards, each piece is 
fundamental. 
10.5. Security Push Practices 
Although we cannot comment about criticality levels of mistakes, we can suggest 
where to start for any security push. This is because some practices proved to be 
more beneficial in the short run. This guideline is especially useful if software is 
suffering vulnerabilities and there is only short amount of time to fix them. 
A security push can be done only if everybody in the team believes its necessity and 
spares time for just security inspections. This was the way that Microsoft 
Corporation  conducted Trustworthy Computing Initiative since 2001 and related 
security pushes in 2001 (.Net Framework) and 2002 (Windows Server) [59]. 
10.5.1. Consider Reducing Attack Surface 
Obviously, if an application is suffering from much vulnerability, first thing to do 
should be reducing the number of vulnerabilities. Easiest way to reduce the number 
is cutting of the features. Generally, if the future is not present, an attacker cannot 
attack to it. However, this is not always practical or even possible. What can be done 
alternatively is that reducing the number of services that is enabled by default. There 
are several advantages of this, as documented in [59]: Attackers get more reluctant to 
attack that feature since less people is using it. Moreover, even if the vulnerability is 
exploited, less people get affected. In addition, people who do not deploy that feature 
can wait for installing patches until it is most appropriate time for them. 
We understand that some applications can be very complex to make such changes 
during maintenance phase. Another solution for these products can be implementing 
131 
a custom designed filter application. After filtering harmful or dangerous content, 
application can continue processing pre-processed data. 
10.5.2. Consider Alternative Designs 
If the program already consists of visible and clearly defined modules, implementing 
boundary access checks can be easy to implement, of course depending on the 
application. One example is usage of Com modules and implementing LUA 
principles. This type of change should not require any extensive amount of 
modifications in the actual program logic. 
10.5.3. Consider Using Automated Tools 
One-line code mistakes can cause much more trouble than their apparent sizes, as 
discussed throughout the thesis. Discovering such defect can be done with code 
reviews. However, in order to have effective code reviews, different people than the 
implementer should read the code, of course with the presence of implementer. 
Gathering all of these people and spending time on reviews may not be feasible 
always. In that case, automated tools can be used to increase confidence in the code 
base. The tools that are mentioned in this thesis can be a good point to start. 
Another type of automated tool is the compiler itself. Some compilers present nice 
features to detect and prevent some kind of vulnerabilities, most notably buffer-
overrun vulnerabilities. Considering alternative compilers can result in better tool 
selection that helps improved robustness. 
10.5.4. Consider Being Proactive in Finding Vulnerabilities 
Fixing exploited bugs is not that good as fixing them before they actually become 
vulnerabilities. Therefore, being proactive can really help in improving quality 
before it gives damage, to consumers or to producers. Moreover, being proactive in 
finding vulnerabilities helps for proactive preventions. 
Best proactive method is considered usage of intelligent fuzzers. What a fuzzer does 
is changing actual input data from what it is, and converting it to an illegal shape that 
is unexpected by the input parser. After all, this is what attackers do to discover 
vulnerabilities. Intelligent fuzzers are discriminated from standard fuzzers by their 
knowledge of input format. Changing random bits in the input is not such a good 
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idea in most cases, because it usually breaks simple checks like CRC checks. Packets 
are discarded before penetrating deep enough to cause access violations. What a 
smart implementation can do is changing critical fields (length indicators, 
timestamps, and type indicators), recalculating CRC or any other temper proof 
mechanism.  
Security makes implementations of fuzzers difficult. Since encrypted packages are 
no longer easily modifiable in a smart way, internal hooks can be used to inject 
fuzzer between output processors and encryption logic. 
10.6. Checklist for the Covered Topics in this Thesis 
This section aims to provide a checklist about the topics covered in this thesis. This 
checklist should not be considered as a complete checklist to write vulnerability free 
programs. Writing such a checklist is impossible, indeed. However, this checklist 
summarizes new ideas of this thesis and some other ideas that are used as 
background information with the goal of gathering them into a place where a 
designer, programmer or servicing staff can use a reference to ensure coverage at 
least of the topics of this thesis. 
 
Table 10.9: Checklist for the Covered Topics in this Thesis 
Checklist Item Y N
Am I sure that I have understood my potential enemies?   
Am I sure that I have understood possible motivations of my enemies?   
Do I have a clear understanding of why my system may be susceptible to 
attacks now or in the future? 
  
Am I sure that I have understood attack types?   
   
Do I have an understanding of roles of modules of my application in the 
sense if they are client, server or both? 
  
Does my client know exact requirements of this project?   
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Do I know the exact requirements of this project?   
Does the client know exact security requirements of this project?   
Do I know the exact security requirements of this project?   
Am I fairly sure that the requirements will not change in this version of the 
product (since it would cause serious design changes, therefore code 
changes and finally security vulnerabilities)?  
  
Am I sure that all of the requirements are necessary for the success of the 
project? Moreover, am I sure that deducting any features from the set may 
cause decrease in usefulness? 
  
Do I know what the effect of the worst attack is?   
Do I know associated costs with DoS, DDoS, Privacy Compromise, Remote 
Code Execution? 
  
Do I know what kind of private data the application can lose at most?   
Do I know what kind of security-usability-performance-cost tradeoffs I am 
making? 
  
Am I sure that I have spoken security trade-offs with my client and made 
them understand what the compromises are? Do they have clear 
understanding? 
  
   
Do I know design patterns?   
Do I know security implications of design patterns?   
Am I proficient enough to select among design patterns according to my 
design and security requirements? 
  
Do I know in what kind of network environment will be my application 
running in (Strictly DMZ in access controlled systems room, strictly DMZ, 
strictly intranet, intranet, and internet)?  
  
Do I know if my application will be susceptible to traffic analysis, packet 
repeat or any other below L4 alterations? 
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Do I know what the encryption modes are?   
Am I sure I made correct encryption mode selection for my project?   
Am I sure that I made correct implementation of the encryption mode I 
have selected for my project? 
  
Did I inspect network traces to ensure that my program is indeed running in 
the desired encryption mode? 
  
Do I make compression before encryption?   
Do I know how a buffer-overrun-attack works?   
Did I select correct user account for the applications runtime context?   
Am I sure that the selected user account is minimum privileged account that 
is possible for the correct operation of the application? 
  
If the user context is privileged, did I modularize my application into parts 
that requires different levels of privileges and access rights? Moreover, did I 
pay attention to the different roles of modules (like accepting input, parsing, 
performing requests, logging, connecting other services) 
  
Do I know infrastructures of Rpc or related technologies (Java RMI etc)?   
Do I know COM or related technology (CORBA, SOAP etc.) 
infrastructure? 
  
Is there a way that I can modularize my application into modules that each 
module runs with minimum privileges that is required for that module? 
  
Am I sure that overhead of Rpc or Com usage is acceptable according to 
requirements and security trade-off decisions? 
  
Am I aware of attack surfaces and threats that are posed to my application?   
Did I obey the checklist in Tight Tunnel section while designing interfaces 
and implementing the code? 
  
   
Am I familiar with one-line code mistakes?   
Did I write my code keeping possible one-line code mistakes in mind?   
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Did I check my code against one-line code mistakes manually?   
Did I check my code against one-line code mistakes automatically?   
Am I sure that I have used all available automatic code analysis tools?   
Is usage of automatic code analysis tools a sign-off requirement?   
Do I know what exception safety is?   
Do I know how to establish exception safety?   
Am I verifying implementation against exception safety requirements in 
each milestone? 
  
Do I understand importance of consisting coding style and format?   
Do I have a consisting code style and formatting among all source files and 
headers? Moreover, are these practices documented in specifications so that 
future maintenance can adhere to the style? 
  
Am I aware of user mode and kernel mode concepts?   
Do I know what can be done wrong with kernel mode access checks?   
Am I doing kernel mode access checks properly?   
Do I have a specification about the relationships among functions?   
Are my functions doing only one thing and doing it well?   
Do I reuse functions so that: 
I will not write defective code while rewriting same functionality several 
times / my changes are consisted / verification time decreases as amount of 
code decreases? 
  
Am I aware of tools that are at my disposal?   
Did I speak with my colleagues about the tools that they are aware of?   
Am I sure that I am using correct tools?   
Am I aware of software libraries that are at my disposal?   
Do I use them according their motivations and expected usage patterns in 
my projects? 
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Do I know my applications thread model?   
Will this thread model be consistent during lifetime of processes? Will this 
thread model be same in future releases? 
  
Am I effectively using libraries?   
Will we support 64 bit? Did I check that my application is designed to 
correctly support 64-bit platforms? 
  
   
Am I deploying the application with minimum set of by-default enabled 
features? 
  
Do I know my compiler and its capabilities well?   
Did I compare my compiler to other compilers before making my decision 
to use it? 
  
Do I effectively use compiler flags to prevent vulnerabilities?   
Is my deployment secure by default? (No administrator action is required to 
make it more secure, like setting registry settings or enabling/disabling 
switches) 
  
Do we sign our releases so that our consumers can be sure that packages are 
indeed coming from us? 
  
Are our uninstall functionalities working properly? Did we test it? (If 
custom setup tools are used, their verification is not done most of the time) 
  
Are we aware of any sensitive data that we are keeping on disc or on any 
other type of permanent storage? 
  
   
Do we have a solid maintenance process?   
Do I know what a regression is?   
Do I believe that me or any other people involved in maintenance process 
knows regressions and has experience in preventing them? 
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Do we have a solid bug bar to be used while triaging bug fix requests? 
(Excessive amount of modification causes regressions, that can cause 
vulnerabilities) 
  
Are code reviews a standard practice in our maintenance processes?   
Is our developers’ proficiency enough (have a good understanding of the 
code, at least six months of experience) with the code? If not, are we 
enforcing architect review before checking in the changes? 
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11. Conclusion and Final Words 
This thesis has examined all phases of waterfall methodology from security point of 
view. Requirement analysis phase proved to be elaborated and we did not have 
anything to add. However, design, implementation, verification, deployment and 
maintenance phases presented areas for improvement and we analyzed them in this 
thesis. This thesis is a valuable resource for further advancements in secure 
application development. 
11.1. Results 
Security traits and robustness of software can be increased in huge amount with 
correct decision in design phase. Similarly, a bad design can render otherwise good 
security tools useless. Even worse, bad design can cause to false sense of security, 
which is only good for attackers. Even the oldest technologies can present new usage 
platforms if they have sound design. Design patterns research showed us that good 
security is another aspect of good design and must be taken account always; usage of 
design patterns may support a good structural design, but it cannot guarantee secure 
design. Secure design is another subject that academics are still working on. 
Researches in implementation phase showed us that even smallest part of code could 
cause big vulnerabilities. Furthermore, it proved usage of static code analyzers to 
prevent detectable code defects. A research about formatting and commenting of 
source code revealed that even high caliber developers tend to omit these good 
habits, yet they want to have them. That survey also revealed that there is high 
benefit with keeping code readable.  
Verification phase of software lifecycle is supported with many tools; most useful of 
them is examined in this thesis. Apparently, many software companies are not using 
them effectively, because they could have prevented many of the vulnerabilities. We 
consider this fact as a result that demonstrates unstructured approach to security 
practices. 
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Deployment phase proved to be least researched area of waterfall methodology. 
Discovery of this fact is probably because of the unique approach of this thesis. 
Contribution of this thesis is examination of compiler switches from security point of 
view.   
This thesis put the sometimes-overlooked importance of maintenance phase in front 
of the eyes of researchers. A research of Microsoft Corporation security bulletins 
revealed that even software a giant like Microsoft Corporation is suffering from 
regressions. That research also showed that security initiatives are really helping 
Microsoft Corporation to reduce the number of successful attacks and to increase 
company reputation. This thesis described important points to prevent regressions 
from happening.  
This thesis also presented a checklist to ensure coverage of new topics that are 
unique to this thesis. Furthermore, there was a chapter about retrofitting existing 
applications in a time-limited environment. This structured approach has been very 
helpful in authors personal projects’ security pushes. 
11.2. Further Research Areas 
Security of applications is still fertile and fruitful area of computer science. Further 
researches in that area will contribute in trustworthy computing environments, which 
we believe is one of the main building blocks of advanced integrated computing 
systems. Although each technologic advancement has its own place, we still think 
that without proper security countermeasures, they will be rendered practically 
useless. 
One of the biggest advancements in security point of view could be done with 
articles that present information about advanced code analyzing tools. There are 
some tools in the public domain, but they just analyze code statically. Static analyze 
means statistically analyzing without actually executing and further interpreting the 
code. Dynamic analyzing methods can help defining security vulnerabilities and 
understanding possible weakest links. They can especially contribute in society by 
analyzing nested code, code relation, data flow, binary representation and execution 
flow. These areas are weakest areas of static analyzers. 
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Another code execution analyzer advancements can be in variable usage area. Each 
variable in each scope becomes different values throughout its lifetime. Some of 
them can reach or exceed bit limits of values. Even approaching to limits can be 
alarming. A smart analyzer should understand value assignment trend. Moreover, it 
should understand what type of operations causes generation of values for 
assignment. That way, analyzer can deduct which values are actual limits for 
variables. For example, if a variable holds values of a multiplication, it can grow 
exponentially and even slightest trend for increase in its values can be proved to be a 
threat. 
Deployment is the least worked on phase of waterfall methodology. We strongly 
believe that there is a good opportunity for further advancements in that area. We 
especially suggest methods for hot patching binaries in the memory. This way, it will 
be possible to apply patches without restarting processes or the system. Biggest 
advantage will be the ability to install latest security patches without any delays (for 
instance waiting for server maintenance schedules etc).  
We also would like to see advancements in tools that automatically track changes 
that are performed by the applications during their lifetimes. This information can 
then be used to uninstall applications in a way that they were never existed. The 
biggest challenge we see in development of such tools is its performance and 
transparency. Accuracy is another challenge, but can be resolved with cooperation of 
applications. 
As research in regression section shows, industry needs a way to reduce number of 
regressions caused from vulnerabilities. Increased size of code base and number of 
supported platforms makes this need high priority. Regressions can be decreased in 
several ways. One of them is improving maintenance processes. This is generally 
more costly approach, because it involves new hires or organizational changes. On 
the other hand, designing software to be maintenance aware could be very cost 
efficient. Although we are not aware of such an academic paper, some companies 
(especially Microsoft in order to support its aging operating system Windows) 
implement some methods. An academic research could help the industry in a broader 
perspective. 
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12. Appendix A: Glossary of Terms 
This short glossary of terms is used in the thesis. 
Black Hole Attack: In this kind of attack, attacker makes a very low cost request to 
the peer, who will allocate considerable resources to satisfy the request. However, 
attacker never goes on with the transaction, yet still makes other requests. Attacked 
program throws even more resources to the sink and finally crashes. Tcp Syn attacks 
can be an example for this kind of attack. 
Buffer Overrun: Attacker exploits vulnerability by writing its own data to a buffer 
beyond its limits. This causes to overwrite stack of the thread and thus modify it in 
the way the attacker wants to. Since local variables and return address are kept in the 
stack, attacker can change internal state of function call or change return address to 
branch to a desired function. This type of attack can be achieved by leveraging other 
attacks. 
Denial of Service (DoS): Attacker manages to prevent the service providers from 
servicing anymore. Users experience shortage in the provided services up to the point 
where there is no service at all. This kind of attacks gives economic damage and bad 
reputation to the attacked people, however less advantage to the attacker. Therefore, 
attackers use this attack to stage other attacks or just for fun or reputation. 
Integer Overrun: Integer variables, like all other variables, are kept in fixed size 
storage. Since a certain amount of bits is required to hold certain amount of number 
combinations, variables maximum values are fixed, too. If someone starts with 
incrementing an integer value, it will finally exhaust possible combinations and then 
will silently over wrap to zero. This event is called integer overrun. Integer overrun 
can happen during almost all types of arithmetic calculations. Because of the 
incorrect results of calculations, program behaves erratically and may cause 
vulnerabilities. Integer overflows generally are very hard to exploit. What makes 
them dangerous is that they open the way for potential buffer overrun vulnerabilities. 
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Local Attack: This attack type can be only performed locally. This means that a user 
must be logged on. However, type of user may vary. Some attacks require that at 
least a normal user to be logged on; other can work with just a guest account. Since 
local attack implies physical access to the machine, this kind of attacks is considered 
less critical. 
Remote Attack: Attacker can exploit the vulnerability even from a remote system. 
This of course implies a networked situation and therefore affects only the computers 
that are connected to the network. However, interestingly, some of these attacks can 
be performed locally from a loop back interface. Attacking a system that is on the 
other end world remotely is huge opportunity for attackers. Since no physical access 
is required, this is the type of attacks, which frightens the system administrators. 
Remote Code Execution: Attacker manages to execute his or her own code in the 
remote system, most probably by leveraging a buffer overrun. Injected code can do 
whatever the user context that the thread is running can do. If the user context 
belongs to a less privileged account, attacker is very limited with what can be done. 
On the other hand, if the context belongs to a highly privileged account, attacker can 
virtually do everything that he or she wants. In theory, this type of attack goes to the 
level of performing arbitrary operations like an administrator on the local console. 
Privacy Compromise: While remote code execution ability is ultimate goal when 
attacking a system, a privacy compromise may do as well if this is what required 
after all. In this situation, attacker manages to make remote reveal the information 
that it should do normally. Disclosed information can range from system uptime, to 
the level of personal records of people of corporate records. 
Privilege Elevation: Attacker manages to increase its privileges beyond what he or 
she was granted originally. Then, of course, he or she uses these privileges to make 
actual attack to the system. 
Traffic Analysis Attack: Network traffic of the system is analyzed in terms of its 
nature, behavior and patterns. Then, the system is attacked by modifying, repeating, 
analyzing or spoofing the network traffic. 
Trojan Horse: (As used in computer science) Attacker injects arbitrary code to the 
otherwise useful and benign application and convinces attacked user to use that 
program. Since user thinks that the program is no harmful, he or she accepts is into 
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the premises of his or her user context by running it. While seemingly no harmful, 
application performs its damage in the background using the rights and privileges of 
the user, who ran the application. 
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